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ABSTRACT
Military Downsizing in the United States examines 
military downsizing efforts during the late 1980's and 
early 1990's. It begins with an outline of the 
historical development of the United States military, 
and it then evaluates the key economic and political 
factors involved in the recent decision to close bases 
around the country. Military Downsizing in the United 
States then evaluates three separate base closure case 
studies in California. The case studies are Fort Ord, 
the Long Beach Naval Complex, and Norton Air Force 
Base. The goal of these evaluations is to determine 
whether interest group or elite politics is controlling 
the base closure process.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MILITARY FROM THE EARLY 1800's TO THE 1900’s.
INTRODUCTION
The United States military over the last two 
hundred years has undergone considerable evolution. 
Today, the United States possesses a large standing 
military which is, for the most part, voluntary in its 
nature. The military is professional and officers 
usually consider military office a career pathway. In 
addition, the United States military establishment is 
oriented towards procuring high technology weapons for 
the protection of the United States and its allies. In 
a word, the United States military today is a 
thoroughly modern institution with the capability of 
wielding its might anywhere around the globe.
The characteristics of today's military have made 
the United States far more capable of directly 
protecting its economic and military interests than 
ever before. However, the military preparedness of 
the United States has come at a price. Today, it is
1
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more difficult than ever before for the United States 
military to downsize its operations. The inability to 
downsize rapidly when necessary will cost the United 
States taxpayers millions of dollars in the future; and 
in many sectors of the military, there are individuals 
and groups who wish to prevent downsizing for reasons 
other than national security. This reluctance to 
downsize the military when necessary will create 
serious threats to the budgetary process of the United 
States government.
The politics of military downsizing was brought 
back onto the nation's political agenda in the 1990's. 
Included among many of the areas evaluated for military 
downsizing were domestic military bases and facilities. 
The topic of base closures will be the primary focus of 
this discussion; but before addressing the politics of 
base closure, it will be necessary to engage in a brief 
historical review of how the United States military 
became the budgetarily uncontrollable leviathan that it 
is today.
PRE-COLD WAR HISTORY
Prior to the 1800's no professional armies existed 
in Europe or the United States, but this all changed by 
the 1900's. The dramatic change in the military
3
occurred during the late 1700's and early 1800's. It 
was during this time that both the American and French 
Revolutions occurred. These new wars required the 
mobilization of vast quantities of men, and these 
large armies were difficult to control without an 
experienced professional officer corps leading them.
The problem was that the armies of Europe and the 
United States did not have trained officers, and they 
knew that it would be naive to believe that a nation's 
army would always have a military genius like Napoleon 
to guide them. Therefore, the armies of Europe and the 
United States went about creating military academies to 
train a professional officer corps for the military.
In the United States, a serious commitment to officer 
education began at West Point in 1817 after the 
difficulties of the War of 1812. The Navy also 
established an academy in 1845. The end result was the 
promoting of military officership as a viable career 
choice for the first time in American history.1 
Professionalization changed the face of the 
military in another significant way. For the first 
time, the United States volunteer militia was not 
considered the primary basis of American defense.
1-Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the 
Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America (New York: The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 137.
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"Militia no longer figured in the commander in chief's 
calculations... Professionalized regulars reinforced by 
enthusiastic volunteers had replaced the common militia
as the foundation for national defense."2
By the late 1800's the United States had a 
thoroughly well established professional officer corps, 
but it still maintained small peacetime forces for the 
Army and Navy. Originally, these small forces were 
deemed necessary only because the United States had to 
protect its citizens from Indians and naval piracy. 
However, by the last third of the 1800's officers 
began to warn the government of the need to modernize 
the military. They argued that any possible enemies of 
the United States were too strong for the American 
military. They pointed out that the lead time for 
producing modern weaponry was far too long. Finally 
they believed warfare had become too complex for 
amateur volunteer militias to master q u i c k l y .2
The United States military educated people about 
the need for reform through their educational 
facilities and through the writings of military 
intellectuals. One such military intellectual was 
Emory Upton who wrote The Military Policy of the United
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 271.
States after he conducted a world tour to review the 
militaries of other nations in 1875. He advocated the 
adoption of German military methods for the United 
States. He criticized the United States for allowing 
excessive civilian control of the Army, and he worried 
about America's fascination with citizen-soldiers or 
militia. He also praised the Germans for engaging in 
peacetime plans for war; maintaining a large standing
army; and for relying on a system of conscription.4
The Navy also had an intellectual reformer by the 
name of Alfred Thayer Mahan. He published The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 in
1890.5 In his book, Mahan concluded that Britain had 
achieved greatness by controlling the seas and the 
commerce they bore. He believed the United States 
could imitate this greatness by establishing a strong 
merchant marine, establishing colonies, and building a 
large Navy with many battleships.5
By the late 1800's military intellectuals like
4Ibid., pp. 271-273.
^Donald M. Snow & Dennis M. Drew, From 
Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Politics in the
American Experience (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1994), p. 117.
^Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the 
Common Defense: A Military Histor of the United States
of America (New York: The Free Press, A Division
of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 275.
Mahan and Upton had established doctrines which would 
be the basis of military arguments in favor of 
expanding the size of both the Army and Navy. While 
the Army was still no match for any of the great 
military powers of the world at the turn of the 
century, the Navy was slowly becoming a world sea 
power. The United States Navy can credit new seacoast 
emplacements, an expanding specialized industrial base, 
and the writings of Mahan for its growth during this 
time. 7
As can be seen, the establishment of military 
academies and the writings of military intellectuals 
played a key historical role in the development of a 
large and professional military establishment in the 
United States. However, other historical events also 
produced key attributes of today's military. Two such 
attributes were the reliance on high technology 
weaponry and the maintenance of a large global 
military presence. Each of these attributes was first 
established after World War II.
COLD WAR HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINMENT AND 
DETERRENCE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
As the power of Europe and Great Britain dwindled
7Ibid., p. 280.
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after World War II, the United States was forced to 
assume the British role of being a global rival to the 
Soviet Union. As early as 1947 President Truman was 
forced to confront the Soviet Union in both Greece and 
Turkey. He requested $400 million dollars to aid 
Greece against a communist rebellion and Turkey against 
Soviet pressures to revise the international convention 
on control of the Straits. In addition, Truman had to 
fund governments in Western Europe in order to prevent 
them from falling under communist rule, and he had to 
oppose several third world revolutions which were 
communistic in their leanings or sympathies. The end 
result of all this global crisis management would be 
the establishment of the United States' containment and 
deterrence policies by 1953.8
Deterrence against the Soviet Union meant the 
nation would need a strong military to threaten the 
Soviets, and they would have to use their military 
establishment against the Soviets if it was felt that 
their interests were threatened. This deterent 
included the recently discovered nuclear bomb, and it 
also included collective security measures which had 
been established through the Rio Pact and the United
8Ibid., pp. 496-498.
Nations.9
Initially, The Truman admininstration was almost 
completely reliant on nuclear weaponry as the key to 
its deterrence policy. Ironically, the United States 
was reliant on weaponry which its Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) was incapable of delivering successfully to its 
targets. Apparently, the Air Force did not have a 
single team capable of assembling a nuclear bomb until 
1948, and in that same year. General Curtis E. LeMay 
discovered that none of the Air Force1s thirty nuclear 
bomber crews was capable of hitting its targets 
accurately. The reason Truman continued to rely on 
nuclear weaponry was because the Finletter Commission 
and various congressional committees had reported in 
1948 that atomic weaponry and intercontinental delivery 
systems would outstrip defensive systems for several 
years to come. These reports and the detonation of 
the first Soviet nuclear device in 1949 gave Truman 
good reason to approve the hydrogen bomb program in
1950.10
While Truman had begun to mobilize the United 
States' nuclear forces in the right direction, he still 
could not manage to convince the American people of the
9Ibid., pp. 494-496.
10Ibid., pp. 499-501.
necessity to expand the nation's conventional forces 
in order to contain Soviet military activity. In 1949, 
Truman managed to place the United States in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, a collective security 
alliance. This gave him a reason to increase the
United States' conventional forces.H In June of 1950 
the outbreak of the Korean Conflict also gave Truman a 
reason to request increases in the size of American 
conventional forces.*2
By the end of the Korean War, the administrations 
of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson began the process 
of establishing a permanent containment and deterrence 
policy. Nuclear weapons were to remain the center 
piece of this deterrence policy, and by 1965 the United 
States had established a strategic nuclear triad of 
intercontinental bombers, missiles, and submarines.
New collective defense organizations were established 
around the world like ANZUS, and the United States 
established a protective nuclear umbrella.13
13-Ibid., pp. 506-508.
12j0hn M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter, ed., The 
American Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to
the Present (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1993). p. 201.
l^Allan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the 
Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America (New York: The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), pp. 531-533.
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The large alliance systems and elaborate policies 
of containment and deterrence help explain why the 
United States has continually maintained a global 
military presence. However, United States military 
history still has not revealed all the reasons why it 
became so dependent on high technology. To understand 
this phenomenon more thoroughly, one must review the 
administrations that followed Truman.
The Eisenhower administration proposed a "New 
Look" policy for the United States military.
"Eisenhower believed that proxy wars like Korea and the 
pressure of defense spending would fatally weaken the 
American economy... "14 He pledged to reduce the 
military budget by $14 billion in two years, and in 
order to achieve his goal he chose to de-emphasis 
conventional arms in favor of nuclear arms. The 
results were mixed. He did lower budgets, but the 
United States had to maintain an ability to wage a high 
capacity nuclear strike in order to compensate for a 
lack of conventional forces.15
The United States' defense became reliant on the 
high technology involved in producing nuclear weapons.
In addition, the United States required intelligence on
14Ibid., p. 534.
15Ibid., pp. 534-535-
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Soviet military activity. In the years following World 
War II, the CIA relied on immigrants for some 
information, but as the years went on there were fewer 
immigrants. Relying on British, French, and German spy 
rings was not the answer to this problem since the 
Soviets had already penetrated these spy networks. 
Therefore, the only solutions available to the United 
States were such high technology survelliance 
operations as the U-2 spy plane and the National
Security Agency (NSA).1®
Finally, the Eisenhower administration further 
encouraged the development of high technology by making 
nuclear missile development a high priority in the late 
1950's. Ike was encouraged to do this because of the 
Gaither Committee which recommended in 1957 that the 
Strategic Air Command should not be alone in carrying 
the burden of controlling America's nuclear arsenal.17 
In addition, it was during this time that the Soviets 
launched "Sputnik" and proved that their missile 
technology was becoming intercontinental.1®
16Ibid., pp. 536-537.
17Ibid.
1®John M. Carroll & Colin F. Baxter, ed., The 
American Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to
the Present (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1993), pp. 224-225.
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Eisenhower and the Soviets began engaging in a 
race for technology. It was a race which had been 
sparked by Eisenhower's "doctrine of massive 
retaliation" in 1954 and the Soviet's "Sputnik" launch 
in 1957.
"Each combatant had to continually improve its 
arsenal, so as to deter the other from using its 
arms. Fewer and fewer units of each successive 
weapon were made, but each was much more 
technically sophisticated than the last. A 
process of institutionalized innovation was set 
in motion.”19
This continual search for innovation meant a constant 
rise in expenditures for research and development in 
the defense budget, and technical innovation became the 
primary goal of the military-industrial complex in the 
United States.20
Innovation meant that defense budgets would have 
to continue to increase during the Eisenhower 
administration, but it was not innovation alone that 
increased the defense budget during the Kennedy 
administration. Politics played a role in the 
expansion of defense budgets during the Kennedy 
presidency because he had to appear tough on military 
issues to compensate for his Catholicism, inexperience,
l^Ann Markusen et al., The Rise of the Gunbelt: 
The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 30.
2°lbid., p. 32.
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and relatively liberal views of containment policy.
The administration felt it could expand the defense 
budget by $50 billion if it promised more 
centralization and civilianization of defense decision 
making. Kennedy advocated a "flexible response" which 
meant a buildup of conventional arms in order to insure 
that the United States would not need to resort to 
nuclear weapons prematurely during a hot war.
Kennedy's administration also argued for a "two and a 
half war" conventional force which would be capable of 
fighting in North Asia, Europe, and an insurgency- 
threatened state simultaneously.21
Kennedy's administration had the same misgivings 
about extravagant defense expenditures as the 
Eisenhower administration, and Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara tried to streamline the procurement 
process for high technology weaponry. However, the 
Vietnam War and the military contraction during the 
mid 1970's prevented this program from being 
implemented successfully.22
2lAllan R. Millet & Peter Maslowski, For the 
Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America (New York: The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994), p. 558.
22Ann Markusen et al., The Rise of the Gunbelt: 
The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 30-31.
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During the late 1970's the United States lost a great 
deal of control over the spending of its defense 
budget. The end result was a bloated defense budget 
and a large national debt.
THE REAGAN MILITARY BUILDUP
From 1976 to 1980, American public opinion 
drastically changed as the country began to feel that 
not enough was being spent on national defense. Carter 
realized this and in 1979 he reacted by boycotting the 
Moscow Olympics, placing a grain embargo on the 
Soviets, and resuming draft registration. These 
actions were taken by Carter to gain political favor 
with the American public during a presidential election 
year. However, the effort was too little, too late 
since Reagan had already created a strong presidential 
coalition based on a national security platform.23
Between the years of 1981 and 1989 the Reagan 
presidency was responsible for the largest peacetime 
military buildup in the history of the United States.
The Reagan coalition responded to what it and many in 
the United States perceived as a deep decline in the 
economic and military power of the United States during
23Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), pp. 27-28.
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the 1970's. Reagan rejected the liberal foreign policy 
of detente and instead opted for a "peace through 
strength" position with the Soviets as an adversary.
To accomplish his military and economic goals, Reagan 
cut taxes and domestic programs while increasing the 
military budget.24
Upon Reagan1s arrival in the White House he began 
to implement his economic policies which had the effect 
of isolating Democrats from the debate on budget 
expenditures in the United States government. Reagan 
had given the public big tax breaks, and he had cut 
domestic programs. As defense expenditures expanded, 
it was politically infeasible for Democrats to argue 
against larger defense expenditures. It was also 
infeasible for them to be for big tax increases. In 
effect, all the Democrats could do was watch as the 
domestic programs they supported were cut to make way 
for a bigger defense.25
During the early 1980's the United States was 
suffering from a recession which the public expected 
Reagan to fix. Interestingly, Reagan's economic 
philosophy prevented him from using the government to 
boost the economy directly, but by supporting large
24ibid., pp. 1-2.
25ibid., pp. 2-3.
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investments in the military he was able to do this 
indirectly during the recession of the early 1980's.
This military Keynesianism successfully bolstered the 
economy during the recession, and it allowed the Reagan 
administration to ask for more military expenditures.26 
Military Keynesianism and the political isolation of 
Democrats had the effect of institutionalizing the 
annual defense expenditure increases of the 1980's.
Reagan's containment policy valued military 
strength above everything else and it emphasized the 
expansion of the military across the board. Reagan's 
containment policy assumed that wherever international 
conflict occurred the Soviets somehow influenced it.
Of course, this policy of "peace through strength" 
demanded that the United States confront the Soviet 
threat wherever it was perceived, and this doctrine did 
not limit military expenditures or rely heavily on 
diplomacy as had the administrations of Eisenhower, 
Nixon, and Carter.27
In military terms, the Reagan doctrine of "peace 
through strength" meant the expansion of the Navy from 
479 to 600 ships. It meant that the Rapid Deployment 
Force was changed from a force that borrowed troops and
26Ibid., pp. 46-48.
27Ibid., p. 32.
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hardware from the different services to a force that 
allowed for the addition of completely new troops and 
equipment. It also meant the development of more 
conventional high technology weapons like the M-l 
(tank), Bradley (fighting vehicle), DIVAD (air defense 
system), and the Apache AH-64 (attack helicopter). 
Certainly all of these programs had tactical 
justifications for their existence. Some were needed 
for the new AirLand strategy in Europe, and others were 
needed to defend the United States from a new "blue 
water" Soviet Navy. However, the emphasis of the 
Reagan buildup was on Research & Development and 
Procurement, not on operations or maintenance.
Therefore, the Reagan buildup was expected to be 
expensive, but it is important to note that Reagan's 
defense strategy which advocated qualitative not 
quantitative superiority over the Soviets was not
atypical of previous administrations.2®
THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
In March of 1991 the Secretary of Defense, Dick 
Cheney, delivered a speech in which he described the 
international events which had recently occurred in the 
Soviet Union. These international events, in
2®Ibid., pp. 41-44.
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combination with economic events domestically in the
United States, brought military downsizing back onto
the political agenda for the first time since 1979.
According to Secretary Cheney,
"The Warsaw Pact is dead as a military 
organization and the threat of a short-warning, 
global war starting in Europe is now less likely 
than at any time in the last forty five years... 
the Soviet ability to project conventional power 
beyond its borders will continue to decline."
His speech was an acknowledgement by the Secretary of 
Defense that the United States had won the Cold War.
His statement set the tone for future strategic 
military planning in the United States.29
Secretary Cheney's evaluation of future threats to 
the peace of the United States was not completely 
positive. He did point out that the Persian Gulf War 
was the kind of future conflict that the United States 
military could find itself being pulled into in the 
future. Some of the regions of the world where Cheney 
felt a conflict like this could occur included the 
Korean Peninsula, Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.
Cheney pointed out that future United States military 
conflicts would probably be regional, occur with very 
short notice, and involve well armed nations with
2^William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, 
Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 25.
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elements of conventional and unconventional w e a p o n r y . 30 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Dick Cheney 
when they outlined five potential conflict scenarios 
involving the United States' non-nuclear military 
forces. The first of these scenarios was "light" 
insurgency or narcotics activity which could occur in 
various locations. The second was a "light" regional 
contingency being needed in various unspecified 
locations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believed a 
"major" regional contingency could be needed against 
North Korea in the future. Another "major" regional 
contingency could be needed in the Middle East, and 
this was especially true of Iraq. Finally, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff believed a "major" contingency might 
be needed in Europe in the future to fight the still 
"heavy" threat of Russian forces in the area.31
NEW MILITARY DOCTRINES AND CHANGING ECONOMIC 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990's
Based on such international changes. Secretary 
Cheney began the task of drawing up a new military 
strategy for the United States. Interestingly, this 
"new" strategy differed in very few significant ways
30ibid., p. 26.
31ibid.
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from the previous doctrines of containment and 
deterrence. Under the new strategy, strategic nuclear 
forces will be maintained in order to facilitate a high 
level of effective deterrence. Second, strategic 
forces will need to be structured in such a way that no 
nation should feel pressured into conducting a 
pre-emptive strike. Finally, because United States 
capabilities will need to be survivable in the event 
that deterrence should fail, the strategic forces 
should attempt to limit conflict to the lowest level
of violence possible.32
For conventional forces, Dick Cheney and the 
Pentagon decided on a "two war strategy." According to 
this new doctrine, the United States military should be 
capable of fighting two separate major conflicts 
simultaneously, as outlined in the joint military net 
assessment mentioned previously by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. This doctrine means the United States should be 
able to face a full scale war with North Korea and Iraq 
simultaneously or face Russia and a large scale third 
world conflict like the Persian Gulf War 
simultaneously.33
It must be noted that in 1990 Dick Cheney reminded
32Ibid., p. 27.
33Ibid.
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Congress that all defense structure adjustments were 
made possible by positive military trends in the Soviet 
Union and the Third World. He emphasized that recent 
events indicated such positive assumptions may not be 
completely well founded; and therefore, if events 
change, the United States may have to slow down its 
future budget downsizing efforts.
"Even so, he acknowledged that if, 'the Soviets 
were to shift direction again and return to a 
strategy of military confrontation it would take 
them at least one or two years or longer to 
regenerate the capability for a European 
theater-wide offensive or global c o n f l i c t . 1 "34
Despite the end of the Cold War and efforts by 
various groups to engage in military downsizing, 
people like Secretary Cheney still seem to hold on 
tightly to old values concerning defense budget 
measures. Cheney demonstrated a willingness to protect 
operations and support budgets, and he also was willing 
to streamline the process of weapons procurement. 
However, Cheney still demonstrated a tendency for 
favoring expensive next generation weapons which may 
have limited utility in the future. Examples of his 
favoritism can be seen in his support for the B-2 
stealth bomber, army ground-based stealth missile. Navy 
& Air Force stealth fighters, and a hybrid C-17A for
34Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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military airlift capabilities.35
It seems from the descriptions of the new 
international world order that the United States will 
have very little opportunity to downsize its military, 
and yet downsizing efforts have been made. It stands 
to reason that there must be motivational factors for 
downsizing other than a decreasing Soviet military 
threat around the world, such as the large budget 
deficits produced during the Reagan buildup.
According to Senator Sam Nunn (D - Georgia), 
"Secretary Cheney's orders to the services reflected 
fiscal change, not a real threat a s s e s s m e n t . "36 jn 
fact, revisions of the military budget were started 
well before the threat of the Soviet Union was seen as 
diminishing. According to one defense administration 
official, the revision of military budgets before the 
revision of military strategy had wrecked "total chaos" 
upon defense p o l i c y . 37
By 1984, American public opinion experienced 
another dramatic switch in its views concerning the size 
of the United States military budget. In 1980,
35lbid., pp. 52-53.
36Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 218.
37ibid.
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Americans had felt that the United States was not 
spending enough on the military budget, and in 1984, 
Americans felt the government was spending too much on 
a defense budget which needed to be lowered to pay off 
growing budget deficits. The dramatic change in 
opinion did not affect Reagan's administration; but as 
the Soviet Union fell, the Bush administration found 
fewer justifiable reasons for maintaining a large 
military budget. The net result of this change in 
public opinion will be a 1996 military budget which may 
be equal to the purchasing level of the 1980 military 
budget.38
The downsizing effort of the 1990's will be fairly 
extensive, and it will involve all branches and 
functions of the military. Personnel will be reduced 
in the following manner: Active-duty personnel will go
from 2,070,000 to 1,653,000 by 1995; the National Guard 
and Reserves will go from 1,128,000 to 906,000 by 1995; 
and the civilian defense work force will go from 
1,068,000 to 940,000 by 1995. Strategic nuclear forces 
will begin a modest downsizing effort due to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) will be reduced to the Global 
Protection Against Limited Strikes project or (GPALS).
38Ibid., pp. 220-222.
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This reduction will diminish SDI capabilities by half, 
and it will reduce its cost to 80% of SDI's original 
cost. Tactical nuclear weaponry will be reduced as 
NATO begins removing all nuclear ordnances from Europe. 
Finally, all of the services will be modernized, but 
they will also face force cuts.39
THE CURRENT HISTORY BEHIND MILITARY BASE CLOSURES IN 
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 1990's
The Reagan fiscal programs of the 1980's left a 
legacy of overspending and deficits which has forced 
the United States government to engage in budgetary 
downsizing. One way to reduce the large size of the 
military budget is by closing unnecessary military 
bases around the country. Certainly military bases 
have been an acknowledged source of excessive military 
waste and inefficiency, and the Defense Department 
responded to this by forming the Commission on Base 
Realignment and Closure. The commission was first 
suggested in 1984 by the Grace Commission which was the 
President's Commission of Private Sector Survey on Cost 
Control. The Commission was implemented in 1988 by
39william W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, 
Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991),
pp. 28-32.
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Defense Secretary Carlucci.40
The Commission on Base Realignment and Closure 
faced the daunting task of addressing base closure 
politics. The United States government had not closed 
a single base in the United States since 1977 because 
of congressmen who had engaged in pork-barrel politics 
and logrolling in order to prevent their districts from 
losing military dollars. In order to get around this 
problem, the Grace Commission recommended a commission 
with revised procedures. The Commission was designed 
by Secretary Carlucci as a bi-partisan board of 
businessmen and retired military officers. Together 
this group submitted a list of 86 bases which needed to 
be closed and 54 bases which ought to be realigned in 
December of 1988. However, the unique aspect of the 
list was not found in the recommendations but rather in 
the procedure for approval of the list. According to 
the procedures, the Secretary of Defense had to approve 
or disapprove the whole list within 15 days. The 
Congress then had 45 days to do the same. The goal was 
to prevent Congress from making exceptions for each 
base on the list.41
40Daniel Wirls, Buildup; The Politics of 
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 212.
41Ibid., p. 213.
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Initially, the suggestions and proceedings of the 
Commission were only authorized by then Defense 
Secretary Frank Carlucci. However, in October of 1988 
the Commission was legally recognized in legislation 
passed by Congress.42
The new regulations went a long way in forcing the 
United States to face up to the need to downsize and 
close inefficient military bases, but the United States 
Congress did not allow the new commission's regulations 
and procedures to prevent them from engaging in last 
minute politicking. Congress took all 45 days to act 
on the Commission's recommendations, and many 
congressmen threatened to strike the law down when 
appropriation debates occurred during the next two 
budget cycles. Opposition to the list was bi-partisan 
and included both liberals and conservatives. 
Congresswomen like Nancy Pelosi (D - San Francisco) and 
Barbara Boxer (D - California) argued that closing the 
Presidio in San Francisco would cost more than keeping 
it open. Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois tried to get 
copies of the transcripts of the Commission's 
proceedings in order to use them to prevent bases from
42pefense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 36.
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being closed in his state.4^
THE CURRENT PROGRESS OF MILITARY BASE CLOSURES DURING 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Today, the Clinton Administration has continued 
the base closures advocated by the Bush administration. 
As recently as March of 1993 Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin advocated that 31 major military installations be 
closed and that the United States scale back and 
consolidate an additional 134. In addition, 29 
overseas military bases have also been slated for 
closure by the administration of President Clinton. In 
a letter to congressmen on March 10, 1993, Aspin noted 
that, "Future changes will decrease force structure and 
will require more, not fewer, base closures than those 
I will recommend at this time."44
The politics of closing these bases will be made 
all the more difficult because of the nature of the 
modern United States military as outlined in this 
chapter. For example, the United States military has 
been essentially an all volunteer force since 1974.
4^Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 213.
44"Aspin targets 31 military bases for closure; 
cutbacks set at another 134 bases," Facts on File, 18 
March 1993 p. 185.
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According to Major Bill Crews, "'You don't just have a 
bunch of draftees who are eager to return to a world 
they know... In many cases, these career-military 
persons have never had another job.'"45 in addition, 
the sheer size and high technology orientation of the 
United States military will make it difficult in the 
future for military forces to simply be terminated 
immediately upon request.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper will be to address the 
politics behind closing military bases in a modern 
military the size of the United States. There are 
several questions which need to be addressed. Who is 
in charge of the closing of military bases in the 
United States? Is it interest group politics or the 
politics of the political elite which fuels the current 
downsizing efforts? Finally, how successful have these 
efforts been in bringing about real change?
Chapter 2 will begin by addressing the primary 
economic structures and economic forces responsible for 
downsizing in the 1990's. Chapters 3 thru 5 will then 
endeavor to understand the politics behind base closing
45van Voorst Bruce, "You're out of the army 
now," Time, 9 March 1992, p. 30.
by addressing three separate cases of military base 
closing in the state of California in the early 1990' 
Finally, the conclusion will take the knowledge 
gathered from chapters 1 thru 5 and attempt to answer 
the questions previously mentioned in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC 
FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY BASE 
CLOSURES IN THE 1990's
INTRODUCTION
The Reagan military buildup was economically 
excessive, and few people in the Defense Department 
would deny the fact that downsizing must occur.
However, as will be demonstrated, in defense politics 
it is always easier to create than to destroy. Any 
attempts to downsize the military must contend with the 
political economics of the "iron triangle". Chapter two 
will focus on the primary economic structures and 
economic forces involved in the issue of military base 
closings in the United States during the 1990's. 
Therefore, this chapter must do three things. First, 
it must discuss what the "iron triangle" is. Second, 
this chapter has to display all the significant 
political players involved in the "iron triangle". 
Finally, it must relate these players and the "iron 
triangle" to current base closing efforts.
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IRON TRIANGLES AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL FIRM
An iron triangle, "refers to a nexus of interest 
and cooperation among a bureacratic agency, a 
congressional committee, and some private interest, 
usually in industry or business. These triangles are 
characterized as 'sub-governments' because they form 
agenda-setting and decision-making units that exclude 
broader participation. " In defense, the role of the 
bureaucratic agency is fulfilled by the following 
political players: the Department of Defense, the
National Aeronautical Space Administration, and the 
nuclear weapons branch of the Department of Energy.
The Congressional role of the "iron triangle" is 
fulfilled by the House & Senate Armed Services 
Committees, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 
and the various congressional members of 
defense-related districts and states. Finally, the 
private interest role is fulfilled by military firms, 
labs, research institutes, trade associations, and 
trade unions.2
There are many different types of "iron triangles"
^Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of
Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1992), pp. 94-95.
^Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense 
Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New York, New York:
Transaction Books, 1981), p. 24.
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in the United States government, and the best way to 
demonstrate their effect is by showing how they alter 
the behavior of military industrial firms. Eventually 
this example will be used to provide greater insight 
into how "iron triangles" affect attempts at closing 
bases across the country. However, before proceeding, 
certain myths about the "iron triangle" must be 
dispelled.
In Dismantling the Cold War Economy, Ann Markusen 
and Joel Yudken present evidence from interviews which 
demonstrate that the "iron triangle" of defense is not 
quite as rigid and structured as people believe. For 
example, they found that neither the congressional 
defense committee leadership nor congressional voting 
patterns directly correlated with defense expenditures. 
The authors cited two reasons why defense expenditures 
were not directly controlled by key congressmen. First 
of all, the authors pointed out that Congress is not 
the only key player in the defense game. A project 
reaches Congress only after years of gestation, and the 
Pentagon usually has already determined who it wants to 
do business with before Congress sees the funding 
request. They also pointed out that most people assume 
that the majority of all defense expenditures go 
directly towards the creation of new production 
facilities. In reality, most annual defense
33
expenditures go to incremental projects, replacement 
parts, or new & modified generations of equipment. 
Generally, congressional porkbarreling only occurs when 
a defense expenditure item is large.3 Therefore, the 
"iron triangle" is a political mechanism which usually 
only operates when the political stakes and economic 
value of a project are high.
"Congressional configurations as well as 
presidential preferences, do appear to be more 
important in explaining military facility 
location than the location of defense 
manufacturing and service capacity. The infamous 
role of Sen. Lyndon Johnson in establishing 
Houston's space center and Sen. John Stennis's 
(D - Alabama) role in Huntsville's growing 
arsenal are but a few of the many suspected 
instances."4
However, even in the building of new bases 
congressmen have much more control over preventing the 
closing of bases in their districts than initiating the 
opening of bases in their districts. One reason for 
this is the fact that a congressman's constituents 
will hold him accountable for the closing of a base in 
his district, but they will never hold him accountable 
for not opening a base that does not yet exist.
Another reason why congressmen exercise more control 
over base closing is the fact that maintaining funding
3 Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the 
Cold War Economy (United States: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1992), pp. 194-196.
4Ibid., p. 196.
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in Congress is always easier than starting new funding. 
According to United States Air Force General John 
Herres:
"'the military is the dog that gets wagged by the 
tail when it comes to base closings....
Operating base structure is expensive as hell.
You don't win wars with base structure, but with 
weapons systems. We always want to close more 
than we can get away with. But we always get 
zinged by the political community.'"5
People can also be deceived into believing that 
congressmen from military districts tend, by their 
nature, to be pro-military. Often people will assume 
that their pro-military stance is the reason why the 
district receives large amounts of military funding. 
There is a simple explanation for why this is not 
always the case. People who are elected from a 
military district will tend to have a pro-military bias 
due to the local economy's dependence on defense 
dollars. They will naturally tend to want to be on key 
defensive committees because of their constituents. In 
effect, pro-military congressmen do not always initiate 
porkbarrel defense spending for their district because 
many times the defense spending was initiated at the 
request of the district before they came to Washington, 
D.C.6
5Ibid., pp. 194-195.
6Ibid., p. 197.
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THE KEY COMPONENTS (POLITICAL PLAYERS) IN THE IRON 
TRIANGLE
Clearly the "iron triangle" is not as rigid or 
simplistic as the previous definition implied, and with 
that in mind it is now time to analyze the various 
components of the "iron triangle". All three groups in 
the "iron triangle" have something in common. Each of 
them is interested in how the military research and 
development money is spent by the United States 
government, but no one is more interested than the 
military industrial firms. In order to maintain 
leadership roles in their field, defense contractors 
are constantly engaging in research and development 
operations. These research and development operations 
are what allow the corporations the ability to produce 
the new weapons that the Pentagon is interested in. A 
large majority of all the research and development done 
by corporations is funded by the government, so it is 
imperative to each corporation that it lobby the
government for money.̂
In order to accomplish their goals, defense 
contractors trade in two separate political commodities 
(information & influence). Contractors seek
^Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense 
Contracting; The Iron Triangle (New York, New York: 
Transaction Books, 1981), p. 96.
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information on future weapons programs; federal 
procurement and regulations plans; how bureaucrats and 
congressmen feel about a weapons project; and what 
defense legislation will look like. Government 
relations officers and Washington staffers relay this 
information to defense companies who use it to continue 
preparations for production of future weapons systems.® 
Government relations officers will also try to 
help their companies gain influence in governmental 
proceedings and decision-making. Influence will allow 
the company to have an edge over other companies in the 
defense budget proceedings, and influence can be gained 
in many different ways. The company may try to 
neutralize Congress, or sell the company's idea to 
bureaucrats in the executive branch. If these 
strategies do not work, it may take its case to the 
voters through grass-roots lobbying efforts and
campaign contributions.9
When lobbying, it is important to remember that 
lobbyists do not make distinctions between lobbying 
Congress and the executive branch. The Washington 
staff will take the intiative at the legislative, 
procurement, and appropriation levels. Washington
®Ibid., p. 23.
9Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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offices design the grass-roots efforts aimed at 
employees, stockholders, and local communities. They 
also manage campaign contributions and direct contacts 
with members of Congress. Therefore, they are the 
heart of all activity in the "iron triangle".10
The military industrial firms are the most active 
instigators in the "iron triangle", and nowhere is this 
more clearly seen than in the relationship between the 
corporate Washington offices and the Congress. Gordon 
Adams engaged in a study of the political activity of 
eight different major military industrial firms in the 
late 1970's & early 1980's. In three different stages 
of the study he tried to determine how military firms 
were utilizing their political action committee money.
In the first stage he matched the company plants 
to congressional districts to see if certain 
congressmen received campaign contributions because 
their home district was a corporate district. In the 
second stage the author selected eight key 
congressional committees that deal with the projects of 
the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautical 
Space Administration. Amongst these committees were 
the pivotal House and Senate Armed Services Committees 
and the House and Senate Defense Appropriations
10Ibid., p. 130.
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Subcommittees. He then compared the membership of 
congressmen to these committees with the amount of 
campaign contributions that they received from military
contractors.11
Unfortunately, the campaign contributions from the 
companies averaged only 28.4% in stage one and only 41% 
in stage two. These totals were certainly not the 
percentage of campaign contributions that one would 
expect to find in a strong "iron triangle" because over 
half the money was still falling into non-military 
congressional campaigns. However, the final stage of 
the study proved that there was a strong link between 
the Congress and the companies. In the final stage, 
the author combined the previous two categories of 
statistics and eliminated any double counting. The 
average percentage of contributions shot up to 59%. The 
highest contributions came from McDonnell Douglas (78%) 
and Lockheed (67%); and Northrop, Rockwell, and General 
Dynamics also managed to spend over half of their 
campaign contributions on key geographic and committee 
candidates.I2
The political contributions made by military 
corporations help congressmen stay in office, so
n Ibid., p. 116.
12Ibid., pp. 117.
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congressmen are naturally eager to listen to what 
these military firms have to say. Both groups need 
each other politically, and therefore, they create a 
bond which is extremely difficult to break. However, 
corporations are not the only groups that can help 
congressmen stay in office. Voters also have the 
ability to establish an "iron triangle" bond with their 
congressmen. As stated by former Defense Secretary 
Dick Cheney, "If we leave base closing up to the 
communities affected or to the members of Congress 
affected, there won't be any bases closed. I get paid
to make these kinds of d e c i s i o n s . jn effect, Cheney 
is pointing out that an "iron triangle" bond between 
the local communities and their congressmen exists. It 
uses votes instead of political contributions in order 
to maintain the bond.
The bond between voter and congressman is not 
necessarily beneficial to the common good, and it often 
promotes only the self-interests of the local voters.
For example, in the first round of base closing 
proposals that occurred in 1988, the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission suggested 55 
domestic military bases for closure. The plan 
collapsed under a hail of partisan recriminations in
13"Cheney Seeks to Close 31 Major Bases in 
U.S.," Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A 1 .
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Congress even though the United States desparately 
needed to reduce the government deficit partially 
created by excessive defense e x p e n d i t u r e s . ^  The bond 
between community voters and their congressional 
representatives is part of the "iron triangle" that
prevents bases from being closed, and it is this "iron 
triangle" which the discussion will focus on in 
chapters three thru five.
However, the "iron triangle" example utilized to 
describe the behavior of military-oriented corporations 
has not been completely described as yet. Thus far, 
the example has taken only the behavior of the 
corporations and Congress into consideration. What 
about the executive branch?
While campaign contributions and votes may explain 
many of the reasons why Congress behaves the way it 
does, these points still do not explain why the 
executive branch would cooperate with corporations.
The answer can be found in the advisory committees and 
personnel transfers of the Department of Defense.
Defense contractors often engage in lobbying 
efforts through entities like defense advisory 
committees. The advisory committees serve as a vital 
link between the executive branch and industrial firms.
14 Ibid., p. A24.
41
In 1979, the Department of Defense ranked sixth in the 
total number of advisory committees in government, and 
it ranked eleventh in the total number of members on 
advisory committees (777). The committees deal with a 
wide range of issues of interest to both the Department 
of Defense and military firms. Among the most 
important of these committees is the Defense Science 
Board which is responsible for making decisions 
concerning the valuable research and development funds 
of the Pentagon.*5
In addition to their lobbying efforts, 
corporations have been known to offer tangible 
benefits to individual employees of the executive 
branch. Retired men and women of the armed forces are 
often hired by military firms for their knowledge of 
government, aerospace technologies, and procurement 
strategies. Their expertise goes beyond general 
knowledge of the process and extends into access to the 
process. In addition, companies often have a hand in 
the choosing of key administrative officials in 
defense. From 1969 to 1973 it was noted that the top 
100 defense contractors in the United States had hired 
1,400 former employees of the Department of Defense,
l ^ G o r d o n  Adams, The Politics of Defense 
Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New York, New York:
Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 167-168.
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and 379 former employees of contractors became 
employees of the Department of Defense during the same 
time period. The exchange of these employees between 
military firms and the government can benefit the 
firms' future business dealings with government and 
give government a view of how contractors conduct 
business. The bond between business and the executive 
branch also tends to exclude outsiders from the
political p r o c e s s . T h e r e f o r e ,  the executive branch 
can form a bond of dependency with defense contractors 
thru the offering of employment outside of the 
government.
The defense department1s desire to maintain good 
employment opportunities beyond their government 
careers forces them to work cooperatively with military 
contractors, and the executive branch's desire to 
maintain employment also is an important factor in the 
anti-base closing "iron triangle". No defense 
department employee is going to be willing to close 
military bases if they feel that their job is going to 
be eliminated in the process. These employees are more 
likely to join forces with their local community voters 
and congressional representatives. Together these 
three political groups have one thing in common. They
16Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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desire to maintain the flow of government money and 
jobs into their district just like the military 
corporations did in the previous example.
The "iron triangle" formed by local communities, 
congressmen, and local military employees can be 
devastatingly effective at thwarting any attempts at 
closing down local military bases and facilities. 
However, the local military "iron triangles" have been 
relatively powerless against base closing efforts of 
the early 1990's. How is this possible?
Rep. Dick Armey (R - Texas) felt the only way to 
break the local military "iron triangles" was to 
eliminate their desire to cater to local parochialism.
He did this by conceiving the legislation responsible 
for creating the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. The eight member panel was to be composed 
of non-congressional, unelected officials who would be 
solely responsible for drawing up the list of bases 
needing to be closed. In effect, the commissioners 
became the legislators of base closing, and they 
eliminated the United States Congress from the local 
military "iron triangles". The local communities and 
local military employees can threaten the commissioners 
all they want, but their threats will be ineffective 
because the commissioners are insulated from being
44
voted into their positions.^
The question remains, however, why would 
congressmen endorse the creation of a commission which 
takes their legislative powers away from them? The 
answer to this question is that it provides a perfect 
political cover for the Congress. Congress knows that 
it must cut defense budgets in the national interest of 
the United States, but they can't simply ignore the 
pain their local districts must sometimes endure for 
the national interest. The commission makes the tough 
decisions as to who will lose their bases, and the 
individual congressmen can be allowed to protest the 
choice of their bases for closing. Politically,
Congress loses responsibility for actions that they 
themselves had begun by creating the commission in the 
first place.
The previous chapter briefly discussed the 
procedure utilized by the Commission to close bases, 
but the procedure is much more detailed than this brief 
summary may have implied. Therefore, a more 
substantial discussion of the role of the Department of 
Defense in base closings is necessary. This is
■̂ ■̂ Neil Brown, "Base Closing Process Thwarts 
Parochialism," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 10 
July 1993, p. 1842.
18Ibid., p. 1842.
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especially true since a more in depth analysis of the 
Defense Department's role will reveal how the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission further 
isolates local military employees from the 
decision-making process occuring in the Department of 
Defense.
THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IN BASE CLOSURES
Two separate criteria were utilized in the 
decision-making process. The first of these criterian 
used for determining which bases needed to be closed 
was the force-structure plan submitted to Congress with 
the Defense Department1s budget request for the year 
the base closings were being advocated. The second set 
of criteria used to determine which bases needed to be 
closed consisted of eight key points. The first four 
points concerned the military value of individual bases 
and considered the following issues: "current and
future mission requirements; availability and condition 
of land facilities and air space; contingency and 
mobilization requirements; and cost and manpower 
implications." The four remaining points concerning 
individual bases considered the following issues:
"return on investment; local economic impact; impact on
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community infrastructure; and environmental impact.nl9
Together these two criteria placed distance 
between both local communities & local military 
employees and the Department of Defense. Politically, 
community leaders would be incapable of simply arguing 
that closing a base would be harmful to a community.
The Defense Department would be capable of using its 
two sets of criteria to find a defense against the 
parochial arguments of communities. Essentially, the 
two criteria reduced political discussions of base 
closing down to the level of military necessity. 
Community economic needs virtually became a non-issue.
These two criteria were given to the three 
branches of the armed forces, and each of them were 
expected to create their own list of bases to be 
closed. Each of the armed services established a high 
level commission to accomplish this goal. They then 
submitted their lists to the Secretary of Defense for 
his approval.20 Therefore, the lists were prepared by 
high level officials of the three branches of the armed 
services and the Department of Defense. None of these 
officials were tied to local bases due to their
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. 
Report to the President 1991 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 18.
20Ibid., pp. 18,21-22.
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positions in the bureaucracy, and local military 
employees could expect very little assistance or mercy 
from these officials.
In order to further guarantee that a base would 
not be kept open for reasons other than military 
necessity, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act 
of 1990 placed a restriction upon the activities of the 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The 
Commission is allowed to deviate from the list of base 
closure recommendations it receives from the Secretary 
of Defense only when they find "substantial deviations" 
from the force-structure plan and selection criteria.21 
Parochial politics are not allowed to blur the need to 
close basing facilities, and no base is allowed to be 
given preference over another unless the base can 
justify its existence according to the two test 
criteria.
One problem that could arise from this procedure 
is that the armed services may initially "cheat" when 
they produce their base closing lists. The Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act prevents this problem 
by involving the General Accounting Office. The 
General Accounting Office is fully integrated into all
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 3-2.
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review and analysis efforts during the production of 
the list. Each of the armed services was obligated to 
have a General Accounting Officer placed on their base 
closing commissions. The General Accounting office 
also verified the data produced by the armed services 
for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.22
The Commission's efforts were further shielded 
from partisan politics by making all of their meetings 
open to the public. Community and congressional 
leaders were allowed to offer testimony and viewpoints
concerning their local base facilities.23 on those 
occasions where partisan politics played a role in the 
choosing of a base the local leaders could come before 
the Commission and lobby the board for its removal.
The Commission also allowed public testimony from 
Department of Defense officials and other expert 
witnesses. Local leaders could not even complain about 
the hearings being held exclusively in Washington D.C.
because they were held all over the c o u n t r y . 24
22uefense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 23.
23ibid., p. 12.
24Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. vii.
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Finally, communities which will suffer base 
closures are not going to be able to complain that the 
economic pain of the closure will be absorbed only by 
their community. This parochial argument will not get 
communities very far because the federal government is 
obligated by law to help communities through this kind 
of crisis with the help of the Economic Adjustment
Program.25
During the transition period which often lasts 
between three and five years the communities will 
receive help from the Defense Department in three ways. 
First, the Department of Defense is obligated to 
restore the environmental integrity of any polluted 
military facility through the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
and the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. 
Second, the Department of Defense is obligated to help 
all civilian and military employees who are forced to 
move due to a base closure. The Defense Department 
does this through the Homeowners Assistance Program 
created in 1966. Finally, the Department of Defenses' 
Priority Placement Program and Displaced Employee 
Program provide civilian employees assistance in
25uefense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991) , p.74.
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finding a new job in defense or in other government
departments.26
These benefits lessen local community and military 
employee anger at the base closing process, and 
therefore, they further prevent local constituents from 
activating the local military "iron triangle".
However, the success of actions taken by the Department 
of Defense to eliminate local military "iron triangles" 
can't be measured by what is written into law. The 
best measurement of success can only be determined by 
the progress of military base closing in the 1990's.
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 1988 BASE CLOSURE ROUND AND 
THE BASE CLOSURES THAT CAME AFTER 1988
Comparing the 1988 base closing round with the
rounds that followed it will demonstrate that the
current procedure for base closing is much more
effective at what it seeks to accomplish than were
previous procedures. On May 3, 1988, Secretary of
Defense Frank Carlucci formed the Defense Secretary's
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. It studied
and recommended bases for realignment and closure. By
October of 1988, the Congress had passed and President
Reagan had signed Public Law 100-526 which was known as
the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure
26Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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and Realignment Act.27
Unlike the 1988 Commission, the 1991 Commission 
was established in law before the Commission was 
established in reality. The two commissions are very 
different structurally. For example, the 1988 
Commission came up with its recommendations for base 
closing and then reported its results to the secretary 
of defense. The 1991 Commission did this in the 
reverse o r d e r . 2^ in addition, Congress complained that 
the hearings of the 1988 Commission had been closed and 
secretive. Congress also complained that many of the 
threatened facilities had never been visited by the 
commissioners, and faulty data had been used in order 
to determine which bases ought to be closed and which
ought to be left o p e n . 2 ^  As was noted previously in 
this chapter, the 1991 Commission did not suffer from 
these problems because of its reformed procedure.
As would be expected, many congressmen felt that 
the first base closure list was highly partisan in its
27Ibid., p. 17.
^ D e f e n s e  Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. Report to the President 1993 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993),
pp. 3-1 - 3-2.
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 19.
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choice of targets. In noting the difference between 
the 1989 list and the 1991 list, Rep. Les Aspin 
(D - Wisconsin) stated, "... a quick study indicated 
the (1991) list is balanced between bases represented 
by Democrats and Republicans. By contrast, he said, 
all but a handful of the 55 bases on last year's list 
were located in areas represented by Democrats."30
As was noted previously in this chapter, the end 
result of 1989's base closure list was a battle of 
partisan politics in which the base closure list 
collapsed from attacks in Congress. In fact, after the 
ordeal in Congress many of the bases on the 1989 list 
had to be put on the 1991 list.31 The anger raised in 
Congress over the 1989 list is exactly what the local 
military "iron triangle" needs in order to prevent 
bases from being closed. The "iron triangle" finds it 
very easy to gain support for its cause when the only 
reason for certain bases being on a list is partisan 
politics. On the other hand, the "iron triangle" finds 
it very difficult to gain support for its cause when 
the reason for certain bases being on a list is their 
military redundancy.
The current military base closure procedure forces
30"Cheney Seeks to Close 31 Major Bases in 
U.S.," Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A24.
31Ibid., p.A24.
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community leaders and congressmen to justify why their 
base should be spared according to the bases actual 
military value. Initially, community leaders attempted 
emotional pleas of economic hardship, but they found 
that these pleas fell on deaf ears during the 1991 
round of base closings. In the most recent round of 
base closings in 1993 community leaders came to terms 
with the fact that bases were going to be closed. The 
only question left was whether or not their base was 
going to be one of the bases to be closed. The 
community leaders1 only defense in these circumstances 
was to prove that the armed services had underrated the 
value of their f a c i l i t y . 32
Apparently, the new procedures have created an 
environment of frankness concerning which bases must be 
closed. It is no longer denied that some base 
infrastructure is redundant. However, politics still 
does occur in the debate over whose base is most 
redundant. Chapters three thru five study the politics 
of three different California facilities, and each of 
these case studies will provide an illustration of how 
downsizing occurs in the 1990's. However, before 
discussing these, one case study more thoroughly
•^Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Aspin Stands By 
Original List As Panel Winds Up Work," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 19 June 1993, p. 1593.
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demonstrates the "new" politics of base closing in the 
United States than any other. The case study shows how 
even the most well armed community leaders can't 
prevent the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission from breaking through the "iron triangle".
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA: A STUDY IN COMMUNITY
LOBBYING
The city of Charleston, South Carolina was under 
siege during the last round of base closings in 1993.
The United States Navy had proposed closing down the 
naval complex in Charleston, and the closing of all six 
parts of the complex would have cost the city 35,000 
jobs. In addition, the economic cost of lost wages was 
estimated to be in the area of $1.1 billion dollars for
the c i t y . 33
The Charleston Naval Complex was by far the 
biggest cut the Commission threatened to make in any 
community during the 1993 round. Therefore, it stands 
to reason that if the Commission is going to cave into 
political interests this is one area in which they 
might. From the very beginning the base closing 
procedure worked flawlessly. Both of the Senators of 
South Carolina were prevented from becoming too highly
33Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Fighting on the Home 
Front Charleston Defends Itself," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 8 May 1993, p. 1172.
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involved in the parochial interests of their 
constituents. In fact. Senators Strom Thurmond 
(R - South Carolina) and Ernest F. Hoilings 
(D - South Carolina) were each reduced to giving a one 
minute speech before the Commission in defense of the
naval complex.34
However, the community of Charleston had far too 
much at stake for them to simply accept the lose of the 
naval complex. The community leadership armed itself 
with a $1 million war chest, and they hired Washington 
lobbyists and public relations advisers to help them 
lobby the Commissioners.35 Elizabeth Inabinet, the 
President of the local chamber of commerce, was 
responsible for hiring the Washington law firm, and it 
was the local Chamber of Commerce that headed the 
political battle against the Commission. It 
established the group called "In Defense of 
Charleston".36
The goal of "In Defense of Charleston" was to 
present the Charleston Naval Complex as the wrong
34ibid., p. 1172.
35"Panel Completes Recommendations On Closing 
and Consolidating Bases," Washington Post, 28 June 
1993, p. A6.
36Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Fighting on the Home 
Front Charleston Defends Itself," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 8 May 1993, p. 1172.
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shipyard to be closed. They realized that the only way 
they could convince the Commission to keep the naval 
complex open was by presenting them with better 
alternatives for base closings. They decided to lobby 
for the closing of the naval shipyard at Norfolk. 
However, any lobbying effort needs to have more than a 
good argument on its side. A good lobbying effort
needs money.37
"In Defense of Charleston" received money from 
various government entities. Republican Governor 
Carroll A. Campbell Jr. transferred $500,000 from the 
state to the campaign effort. The cities of Charleston 
and North Charleston each contributed $100,000 to the 
lobbying effort. The Chamber of Commerce contributed 
$245,000. Finally, shipyard workers and other 
individuals throughout the community contributed 
$50,000.38
Overall, the local military "iron triangle" 
responded to the crisis as they had always responded 
before. They brought local community leaders together 
with local military personnel and Washington lawmakers 
and they produced a lobbying effort which might have 
saved the complex under normal circumstances. However,
37Ibid., p. 1174.
38Ibid.
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these were not normal circumstances. The lawmakers 
they were trying to influence were men and women who 
were not elected, and thus, not afraid of angry voters. 
In addition, they were lawmakers who had to close bases 
whether local economies were prepared for the closures 
or not. In the end, the panel voted to close both the 
Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Charleston Naval 
Station.39
CONCLUSION
The Charleston case study demonstrates the amazing 
effectiveness of the Commission in breaking the 
"iron triangle" found in local military communities.
The Commission met in 1988, 1991, and 1993 to engage in 
base closure hearings. Another round is scheduled for 
1995.40 The three case studies in the following 
chapters will demonstrate the political actions taken 
by each of the four rounds of base closings. Some of 
the facilities in the case studies were eliminated 
early in the process, and others continue to gasp for 
breath in the final rounds of closures in 1995.
All of the bases are in California. The choice of
^Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Commission Delivers on 
Promise Not To Be 'Rubber Stamp1," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 26 June 1993, p. 1675.
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1993 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 3-1.
this state as a geographical base for this discussion 
is not coincidental. In fact, it is one of the few 
places which can convincingly lay a claim to having 
been hurt more than the state of South Carolina. The 
California Institute is a bipartisan research group, 
and it determined that the state of California had 
suffered 60% of all the net personnel reductions in 
the military during the first two base closing rounds 
of 1988 and 1991. To make matters worse, after all 
the military personnel have been redistributed around 
the country the state of California only seems to be 
getting approximately one-third of its uprooted jobs 
back. Nationally, an average of two-thirds of all 
uprooted military jobs come back to the states they 
originated from.41
41"a  Losing Battle," Los Angeles Times, 29 June 
1993, p. A20.
CHAPTER 3
FORT ORD: A CASE STUDY IN COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
Fort Ord was established in Monterey in 1902 
during the Spanish-American War. Its main purpose was 
to help evacuated troops recover from tropical diseases 
which they had acquired during their tour of duty in 
that conflict. By 1933, Fort Ord was officially 
established as a post in the Monterey Peninsula area, 
and by 1991 the base had grown into an army facility 
with over 15,000 military and 5,000 civilian personnel. 
The base has served many different purposes over the 
years. During the Korean & Vietnam conflicts it was 
a basic training camp, and in the 1970's it became an 
infantry base. The base has expanded over the years, 
and today its facilities cover an area of over 28,000
acres.1
Over the last ten years the Pentagon has 
considered the possibility of closing the base, but it
l"Fort Ord must shut down panel says," San Jose 
Mercury News, 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, pp. INT 
109: F10 - 109: F12.
59
60
was not until November of 1989 that anyone seriously 
threw out a base closure proposal for Fort Ord. In 
November of 1989, Army Chief of Staff, General Carl 
Vuono suggested moving the 7th Division of Fort Ord to 
Fort Lewis in Washington state. The immediate result 
of moving the 7th Light Infantry Division from Fort Ord 
would be to leave the facility without a significant 
mission, and thus, the base would have to close if the 
suggestion was approved.2
Fort Ord has often been considered the "crown 
jewel of army posts", and soldiers from the base have 
served in every major American conflict since World War 
I. The facility certainly has a proud tradition, but 
its closure by the army may save them a considerable 
amount of money in the long run. As of March 1992 the 
United States army projected that the bases' closure 
will save them between $150 million and $200 million
annually.^ As should be expected, such a high return 
of savings should have produced a considerable amount 
of interest in closing the base by both the Department 
of Defense and the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission.
2"Army may shut down Fort Ord," San Francisco 
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 139: 
F5.
2David H. Hackworth, "Last Taps for Fort Ord," 
Newsweek, 9 March 1992, p. 38.
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In fact, Fort Ord was among the bases that was 
suggested for closure in January 1990. The suggestion 
was part of a proposed package of base closures placed 
in the Pentagon's 1991 budget blueprint. However, this 
list received a chilly reception from Congress because 
of the severe economic impact it would have on local 
communities. In addition, the selection of bases 
seemed to be overwhelmingly biased against Democratic 
districts. In the end, the list of base closures 
revived the Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 
1988 because Congress desired a fair evaluation of 
bases before their suggestion for closure. Congress 
accomplished the Commission's revival through the 
passage of legislation which gave the Commission legal 
reinstatement.4
The chilly reception of Congress towards the 1990 
base closure proposals saved Fort Ord from being closed 
that year. However, the reactivation of the Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission meant that Fort 
Ord’s fate was only postponed to a date later in the 
future. On July 1, 1991, Chairman Jim Courter and his 
Commission suggested the closure of several bases 
throughout the state of California. Amongst these
4"New Move to Close Fort Ord is Expected," Los 
Angeles Times, 11 April 1991, p. A3.
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bases was Fort O r d . 5
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURE OF FORT ORD
However, before discussing what occurred during 
the base closure process it is important to address the 
reasons why the military felt Fort Ord was no longer 
worthy of being kept open. One of the reasons why the 
military wanted to close Fort Ord was explained in a 
December issue of the Armed Forces Journal. The report 
pointed out that the Army had too many light infantry 
divisions. It also pointed out that the light 
infantry's mission of rapid deployment into hot spots 
around the globe was in fact a mission that was in 
conflict with the primary role of the Marine Corps. 
Therefore, the 7th Division's move to Fort Lewis and 
conversion from a light infantry unit to a heavy 
infantry division with tanks would eliminate both 
problems.®
Moving the 7th Division to Fort Lewis would solve 
some of the problems associated with the 7th Division's 
mission being limited to light infantry, but the
5"State Wins, Loses on Base Closings," Los 
Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A1.
6 " A r m y  may shut down Fort Ord," San Francisco 
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
139: F6).
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question still remains as to why the Army felt they 
could not make the 7th Division conversion at Fort Ord? 
The problem with a direct conversion at the Fort Ord 
facility is that Fort Ord is simply too small for 
anything other than a light infantry division.
Therefore, a second problem is that it is a single-use 
base. The United States Army has shown preference over 
the years towards eliminating single-use bases in 
exchange for larger multi-use bases.^
Another problem which contributed to the move to 
close Fort Ord was the difficulties experienced by the 
7th Division during the Panamanian invasion of 1989. 
During that invasion the 7th Division experienced a 
twenty-four hour delay in deploying to the theater of 
conflict. This delay was caused by two problems. The 
first problem was that Fort Ord had no military 
airfield on base to deploy from. The nearest military 
airfield was located 150 miles away at Travis Air Force 
Base. The second problem was that the 7th Division was 
plagued by fog which is a frequent occurrence at both 
locations.® Both problems hamper the abilities of the
7"Fort Ord must shut down, panel says," San 
Jose Mercury News, 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
109: Fll).
®"Army may shut down Fort Ord,1 San Francisco 
Examiner, 27 December 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
139: F5).
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7th Division to deploy rapidly, and this is a problem 
since rapid deployment is a necessary part of the 
mission of a light infantry unit.
The Base Closing and Realignment Commission found 
the need for the 7th Division to rapidly deploy not 
quite as important as the Army had found it. However, 
they did point out in their report to the President 
that the building of a new airfield or enhancement of 
the old airfield would cost $97 million and might be 
prevented by environmental concerns. They also found 
that moving the 7th Division to Fort Lewis would 
optimize the use of that facility and nearby McChord 
Air Force Base.9
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission also found two additional problems with Fort 
Ord which helped motivate their decision to recommend 
closing Fort Ord. The first problem was the fact that 
family housing at Fort Ord was limited and expensive. 
According to the report, 1,365 families were 
inadequately housed at the time of the publication of 
the report. The second problem was with the training 
facilities for the 7th Division at Fort Ord and other 
bases in the Monterey Bay area. The report stated that
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 36.
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training for the division was readily available in the 
area, but the training of the division was divided 
between three separate facilities: Fort Ord, Fort
Hunter-Liggett, and Camp Roberts.10
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF FORT ORD ON THE 
MONTEREY PENINSULA
The closing of Fort Ord will be a mixed blessing 
to the people of the Monterey Peninsula. It provides 
them with opportunities that most communities can only 
dream of, and it provides them with challenges that 
other communities can only hope they will never face.
For example, a full third of Monterey County's economy 
is based on the activities occurring at Fort Ord; 
however, the closing of Fort Ord will provide the 
community with 28,057 acres of unused and partially 
developed oceanfront property in an area well known for 
its scenic beauty. Monterey County Supervisor Sam P. 
Karas had anticipated political fights over the 
development of this land, and he planned on insisting 
that Fort Ord be included for the first time in county 
land-use plans when they came up for review in 1990. 
Another state official also voiced Sam P. Karas' fears 
when he stated, "'I'll bet there are a lot of real
10Ibid.
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estate people just licking their lips over this. This 
could well turn into a real battle royal. f" H
Losing a full third of its economy is going to be 
difficult for the Monterey area to handle, but the 
sheer size of the Fort Ord area may prevent a large 
portion of the economic hit Monterey is going to face. 
The Monterey County area currently is faced with a 
housing shortage, and the Fort Ord land will provide 
new areas for real estate developers to move into. The 
future rush to build would provide hundreds of new jobs 
and residents to the area.12
The area will need plenty of new jobs and 
residents according to a committee of county and local 
officials who met in 1990. They reported that the 
closing of Fort Ord would mean a $277 million reduction 
in the personal income of the region, and the base 
closure would be directly responsible for a population 
loss of 33,000 in the Monterey area. Two cities in the 
Monterey Peninsula will be particularly hard hit by the 
base closures. Charles McNeely, the city manager of 
Seaside, California estimated that the city will lose 
$40 million of its $120 million in annual retail sales.
"Folding the Fort," Los Angeles Times, 31 
December 1989, p. A3.
12"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury News,
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66: G13).
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The city also expects to lose between 20% & 40% of its 
40,000 citizens. Mayor Johnson of Marina, California 
anticipates losing 60% of Marina's 26,500 citizens.13 
Another heavily hit institution in the Monterey 
area will be the Monterey Peninsula Unified School 
District. The school district anticipates losing 
one-third of its 15,000 pupils because their families 
are employed by Fort Ord. Another problem the school 
district will have to deal with is the fact that six of 
its schools are located on Fort Ord property.14
The economic statistics previously mentioned tend 
to present the picture of a community soon to become a 
ghost town, but this does not have to be the case. As 
mentioned previously, Monterey has 28,057 acres of 
prime real estate ready to be developed, and a Pentagon 
survey has demonstrated that in the last 100 domestic 
base closings the majority of communities have been 
better off economically five years after closure. The 
surveys have determined that of the 100 bases most 
recently closed by the Department of Defense 42 have 
become airports, 75 have become industrial and office 
parks, and 12 have become four year universities.
13"Towns around bases aghast," San Francisco 
Examiner, 13 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 67:
G6).
14Ibid.
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However, the happy results of these base closures were 
not guaranteed, and some communities will deteriorate 
if they do not make intelligent use of their 
redevelopment opportunities.*5
THE IRON TRIANGLE OF MONTEREY: TURNING FAILURE INTO A 
FIGHTING CHANCE FOR A PROSPEROUS FUTURE
Certainly, the Monterey area would not be expected 
to simply allow such a heavy blow to be dealt to their 
local economy without putting up a political fight to 
keep the base open, and Rep. Leon Panetta 
(D - Monterey) was one of the first congressmen to 
spark life into the local military iron triangle. Leon 
Panetta was a highly influential member of the House 
Budget Committee at the time of the Fort Ord base 
closure process. On December 31, 1989, he stated that 
he would resist any attempts to close Fort Ord or to 
move the 7th Infantry Division. Panetta felt that 
moving the 7th Infantry Division out of California was 
a militarily unsound move. He felt this was 
particularly true since the division was expected to 
move hundreds of miles north of its current location.
In his opinion. Fort Lewis could not offer the 7th 
Infantry Division the same kind of year round good
15»Base Motives," Wall Street Journal, 3 July 
1991, p. A6.
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weather that Fort Ord offers for training. In 
addition, Fort Lewis could not offer the division the 
ability to conduct field maneuvers like Fort 
Hunter-Liggett can at its 165,000 acre reserve near 
Fort Ord. Finally, Panetta pointed out that recent 
expansions of on-post housing at the base made Fort Ord 
among the best bases in the country for housing 
military personnel.
Leon Panetta was not the only influential 
California politician that attempted to come to the aid 
of Fort Ord. California Governor Pete Wilson told the 
press that he was also against closing Fort Ord.
Senator John Seymour (R - California) also took a 
strong stance against the closing of Fort Ord. He 
informed the press in April of 1991 that he intended to 
conduct hearings into the procedures used by the 
Department of Defense to justify their conclusion that 
Fort Ord had to be closed.17
It is important to note the strategy used by the 
Monterey iron triangle. Local and national politicians 
from the area chose a strategy that did not involve 
high pressure tactics. California's politicians chose
16"Folding the Fort," Los Angeles Times, 31 
December 1989, p. A38.
"Town Foresee 'Devastation' if Ft. Ord Is 
Shut," Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1991, p. A24.
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to challenge the Army's arguments for closing Fort Ord 
directly based upon their merits. In many ways their 
strategy was a dramatic success. The Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission agreed with many of 
Fort Ord's supporters that many of the Army's arguments 
for closing Fort Ord were less compelling than was 
originally perceived. One example was the argument 
that Fort Ord could not deploy its troops quickly 
enough. Fort Ord's supporters convinced the Commission 
that this argument by the Army was not persuasive 
enough to close the base. However, their strategy 
failed to pass its most crucial test. California's 
politicians did convince the Commission that Fort Ord 
was more useful than the Army believed, but they could 
not convince the Commission that a different infantry 
base deserved to be closed. Therefore, the Commission 
voted 6 to 1 to close Fort Ord by 1997. Former 
Secretary of the Army Howard "Bo" Callaway was the only 
defender of the base, and he summarized the vote on 
Fort Ord when he stated, "This is the finest light 
infantry base in the world, and we closed it for one
reason - to save $70 million a y e a r . " 1 ^
The United States government broke the Monterey
18"port Ord must shut down, panel says," San 
Jose Mercury News, 1 July 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
109: F10).
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iron triangle with the vote against Fort Ord by the 
Commission. The defeat was evident in the reactions by 
two of Fort Ord's key supporters. Senator John Seymour 
told the press that he would appeal the Commission's 
decision to President Bush. If the Monterey iron
triangle had not been broken by the Commission's
actions it would not have been necessary for Senator 
Seymour to resort to begging President Bush for mercy 
in his state. Rep. Leon Panetta took a different 
approach to the problem. He realized that the fight 
for Fort Ord had been lost and that he was no longer in
a position to prevent the base closure. Therefore, he
told his local constituents that the community had to 
accept the reality that Fort Ord was going to close and
to move on with their l i v e s .
The iron triangle was broken, but it did not 
wither away and die. Rep. Leon Panetta had delivered 
the Fort's eulogy, but he did not simply leave Monterey 
to deal with its new economic problems. Panetta had 
planned ahead, and he had formed a local committee 
prior to the closure to deal with the possibility of 
losing Fort Ord. The committee's goals were to replace 
civilian jobs, help businesses affected by the base 
closure, provide health care to retired Army personnel,
19"state Wins, Loses on Base Closings," Los 
Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A21.
and develop plans for the redevelopment of the Fort Ord
r e s e r v a t i o n . i n  effect, Leon Panetta had taken the 
local military iron triangle's energy and redirected it 
towards redevelopment of the area. Rep. Leon Panetta 
did not stop with producing a local committee to 
address the problems created by the base closure. He 
also sponsored a bill before leaving Congress. The 
bill eventually became law, and it allowed the United 
States military to turn over parts of a military 
facility, a section at a time, once a section of the 
base has been certified as having been free of 
environmental contaminents. This law is important to 
the future of Fort Ord's redevelopment plans because 
state environmental officials have already recommended 
as many as 8,000 acres of the base be fenced off because 
of unexploded munitions.21
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE FORT ORD BASE CLOSURE
Rep. Leon Panetta's (D - Monterey) law is crucial 
to the Fort Ord area because it is the only legislation 
which will help them alleviate the problems of the
20"Towns around bases aghast," San Francisco 
Examiner, 13 April 1991, (Newsbank Indes, p. INT 67:
G6).
21"pollution threatens fast reuse of bases,"
San Jose Mercury News, 22 March 1993, (Newsbank Index, 
p. INT 19: D14).
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superfund law. In 1980, the superfund law passed by 
the United States Congress forced polluters to pay 
fines to repair the environmental damage caused by 
their actions. The goal of the legislation was to 
force the polluter to pay the bill for environmental 
cleanups instead of the taxpayer. An additional 
stipulation of the law was that no portion of a 
superfund site could be transferred or utilized until 
all the contaminants were cleaned from the a r e a . 22 The 
second stipulation of the law would create serious 
trouble for the Fort Ord area because the Environmental 
Protection Agency has designated the Fort Ord facility 
as a superfund site. Cleaning the toxic sites around 
the base could take up to 20 years, and the costs of 
simply examining the problem could come to as much as 
$3 million or $4 million dollars.22
According to the United States Army the Fort Ord 
facility has 19 separate locations which will require 
cleaning, and the cost for the operation is expected to 
come to $60 million. Many of the toxic sites on the 
base are small and are fairly common to any area where
22Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Cleanup at Bases Slated 
to Close Will Take Its Toll in Money and Time," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 7 March 1992, p. 
548.
22"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury News, 
21 April, 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. 66: G14).
a large population resides. For example, the list of 
toxic sites includes: photo laboratories, a plastics
shop, three old sewage treatment facilities, and a 
gasoline station. However, other toxic sites on the 
base are much more exotic. For example, approximately 
9,900 acres of the base have been littered with 
explosives and ammunition. Today those sites contain 
high levels of lead and unexploded munitions, and the 
Army discovered that these sites are threatening to 
pollute the groundwater surrounding the base. The 
contamination of groundwater threatens the water supply 
of 38,600 people and vast agricultural lands that use 
the groundwater.24
Environmental problems like water contamination 
are not issues which Monterey's local politicians can 
choose to neglect. Monterey is home to 15 separate 
environmental groups which have in the past exercised 
considerable power over the direction of development in 
the community. For example, the Pacific Union real 
estate firm purchased 20,000 acres of land in Carmel 
Valley for development, but the company was prevented 
from building more than 360 homes and 140 hotel rooms 
on the property because of the heightened environmental
24"port Ord cleanup a long haul," San Jose 
Mercury News, 30 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
84: D12).
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concerns of the citizens of Carmel Valley.25
Clearly, the various environmental groups of 
Monterey will be opposed to the quick development of 
Fort Ord, and their opposition to the idea will not 
solely be based on the problems of water contamination 
by military munitions. The environmental groups will 
also be concerned with the problems created by 
endangered species of the area. More than half of Fort 
Ord's land provides vital habitat to endangered species 
of the Monterey P e n i n s u l a . 26 Another problem they will 
be concerned with in the future is the problem of 
unexploded munitions in the area. According to the 
Bureau of Land Management, the Fort Ord target range 
will be permanently set aside as wildlife habitat, and 
the United States Army will attempt to remove the 
unexploded munitions from the area over the next 10 
years. A large portion of the unexploded munitions 
will be recovered, and the land will help support 
endangered species like Smith's butterfly and the 
legless lizard. Unfortunately, the technology for 
recovering munitions is primative and expensive, and 
the Army feels that some portions of the target range
25"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury News, 
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66: G14).
26"n o lack of visions for Army base," San Jose 
Mercury News, 31 January 1993, (Newsbank Index, p.
INT 10: B8).
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will have to be kept off limits until better technology 
allows them to recover the munitions.27
REDEVELOPMENT OF THE FORT ORD AREA
Even though the Fort Ord area has some severe 
environmental problems the majority of the base is very 
much ready to be received by the people of Monterey 
County for redevelopment. Unlike base closures of the 
past the United States government has passed a law 
allowing the Army to sell Fort Ord at the maximum 
possible price available on the market. The profit 
from this real estate sale will be kept by the United 
States Army. The 1988 law allowing this procedure is 
very different from previous Defense Department land 
sales because previous sales gave top priority to other 
government agencies. The money generated from the 
selling of Fort Ord is expected to generate $400 
million from private and public interests, and the 
profit motivation behind the land sale has several 
Monterey officials worried. The chairman of the 
Monterey County Board of Supervisors, Sam Karas, voiced 
his fears when he said the following:
"One of the things we're really concerned about
27"Explosives Left Behind Delay Military Base 
Conversions," Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1994, p. A21.
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is, if the Defense Department is trying to derive 
the most amount of revenue from it we might not 
have the money to buy it... Our fear is that it 
will be sold to a private developer. That's our 
great fear. Unless we have some protection, we 
could have development out there that not 
everyone could live w i t h . "28
Monterey officials knew they had to take unified 
action if they wanted to prevent problems like 
undesireable growth in the area. Their solution was to 
create a task force similar to the committee Rep. Leon 
Panetta (D - Monterey) had produced for the community 
during the base closure debate. In the beginning, the 
area consulted with over 380 different citizens from 
business, government, environmental, and community 
groups. Eventually, this group consolidated into a 
smaller group called the Fort Ord Reuse Group (FORG).
The people of Monterey have placed their hopes for an 
orderly and successful redevelopment of Fort Ord in the 
hands of FORG, but some individuals have feared that 
the task force will not be able to accomplish its task 
because it must maintain a shaky balancing act between 
six different government bodies. Each of the 
government entities has a claim on Fort Ord's land, and 
development of the property will only be able to 
proceed if all the parties cooperate. Most of the 
region's citizens have continued to maintain a positive
28"Life after Fort Ord," San Jose Mercury News, 
21 April 1991, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 66: G13).
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outlook on Fort Ord's development, but Josh 
Kirschenbaum, a graduate student from the University of 
California, Berkeley agrees that the pessimists have 
good reason to fear the problems of a breakdown in 
cooperation between the communties of Monterey. He 
studies city and regional planning and he pointed out 
that if the bases' redevelopment is allowed to be 
divided between the various communities then the 
planning process will become a nightmare.29
For the most part the communities of Monterey have 
cooperated with one another successfully, and there has 
only been one hotly contested issue concerning the 
development of Fort Ord. The controversy concerns what 
should be done with Fort Ord's four miles of beachfront 
property and sand dunes. Environmentalists, residents 
of upscale communities, and some politicians in the 
area want the property developed into a state park. On 
the other hand, communities like Marina, Seaside, and 
Sand City feel the area should be zoned for resort 
hotel development to help their economies recover from 
the closing of Fort Ord.20
29"Life After Base Closures Often Turbulent, 
Communities Find," Los Angeles Times, 12 April 1993, 
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 28: B12).
20"impending Closure of Ft. Ord Draws Numerous 
Pet Proiects," Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1991, p.
A33) .
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Suggestions for redeveloping the Fort Ord facility 
vary widely and include ideas like: the building of a
facility for the Internal Revenue Service, the building 
of a military air base for the German government, and 
the building of a new California state university. 
However, none of the ideas suggested by developers has 
sparked as much interest or unity of purpose as the 
building of a new California state university.31
All the developments which will occur at Fort Ord 
will require money, and the bill that Monterey has 
asked the government to pay is extensive. In January 
of 1993, Monterey officials requested $4.8 million 
dollars from the Pentagon's Office of Economic 
Adjustment to fund the completion of the area's reuse 
plan. The amount of money is controversial because the 
Office of Economic Adjustment has never awarded a 
community more than $200,000. Monterey officials also 
requested $37 million worth of appropriations for Fort 
Ord reuse from the Defense Department's budget, and 
they requested $100 million worth of funds from the 
Pentagon to help start the new University at the base. 
Few politicians expect the area to receive all the
31Ibid.
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money they have formally requested.32
However, the area will receive at least $100 
million to $135 million from the 1994 defense 
appropriations budget to help create the new science 
oriented California State University at Monterey Bay.
The money was diverted to Monterey by Rep. Leon Panetta 
before he left to head the Office of Management and 
Budget for President Clinton. Initially, the 
university was planned to have 2,000 students and 
classes started in the fall of 1995. Eventually the 
campus will utilize 1,300 acres of the base, and it 
will take advantage of nearly $1 billion worth of free 
land, dormitories, athletic complexes, streets, sewers, 
and theater complexes. However, the new California 
state university will not be alone among educational 
institutions utilizing the land. The University of 
California, Santa Cruz will develop 850 acres of Fort 
Ord for a technology center concerning computers, 
scientific instrumentation, environmental protection, 
and environmental restoration. In addition, the 
Defense Language Institute, Monterey Institute for 
International Studies, and the Monterey College of Law
32»n o lack of visions for Army base," San Jose 
Mercury News, 31 January 1993, (Newsbank Index, p. 10: 
B8).
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will all relocate to Fort Ord in the future.33 
ANALYSIS OF THE FORT ORD CASE STUDY
In analyzing the Fort Ord case study several questions 
need to be asked. The first of these questions is how 
successful was the process behind closing Fort Ord? In 
the case of Fort Ord the political process behind the 
base closing was highly successful because Monterey's 
local iron triangle was broken by the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission. Proof of this fact 
can be found in the actions of Monterey's top 
officials. Rep. Leon Panetta (D - Monterey), Senator 
John Seymour (R - California), and Govenor Pete Wilson 
of California all were opposed to the closing of Fort 
Ord, but in each case they wielded little influence 
over the final result of the Commission's decision.
This result is particularly surprising because of Leon 
Panetta's strong influence over the House Budget 
Committee. Panetta had enough power to divert over 
$100 million from the defense appropriations budget of 
1994 to provide for the new California state university 
in Monterey, and yet he did not have the power to 
prevent the Commission from closing Fort Ord.
33csu waits as Fort Ord comes in from Cold 
War," Sacramento Bee, 10 February 1993, (Newsbank Index, 
p. INT 19: G5).
The base closing process was also highly 
successful in their case because of the reasons given 
for closing Fort Ord. According to reports and 
testimony from the key officials involved in the 
closing of Fort Ord, the base was as good as any other 
facility in the Army, but the Commission's role is not 
solely to determine which bases in America fulfill 
their mission and which do not. The Commission's 
primary mission is to determine how to save the United 
States money. In the end, the Commission agreed with 
local officials, but they remembered their role and 
they insisted on the closure despite political 
pressure.
The second question this analysis needs to 
consider is whether or not there were any unusual or 
unique patterns of political behavior displayed in this 
case study? Three aspects of the political behavior in 
this case study stand out. The first aspect is that 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was 
able to break the political influence of Monterey's 
local iron triangle. Certainly, this is a break from 
previously established congressional traditions of 
maintaining obsolete bases in congressional districts 
in return for votes in future elections. The second 
unique aspect of this case study is that Monterey 
officials did not attempt to promote strong grass-root
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support for keeping Fort Ord open. Instead, high level 
Monterey officials opted to fight their battle with a 
low level of political pressure which failed to prevent 
their base from being closed. The third unique aspect 
of this case is that the Monterey iron triangle was 
used for purposes other than keeping Fort Ord open. In 
fact, Monterey's local iron triangle played a vital 
role in the redevelopment process for the base after it 
was marked for closure.
The third question which needs to be asked is 
whether or not any good has come out of closing Fort 
Ord? One positive aspect of the closure is that it 
will save the United States a great deal of money which 
the government needs for paying the national debt. 
However, curbing the nation's debt does not help the 
local community which still has to deal with the 
economic blow. Fortunately, Monterey has accepted the 
inevitability of Fort Ord being closed with optimism 
and grace. They opted to take their political energies 
and place the majority of it into a redevelopment of 
the area rather than wage a costly and probably futile 
battle against the Commission. Their political 
initiative and the large size of Fort Ord have already 
brought the beginning of a new university for the area.
The final question which needs to be asked is 
whether or not anything bad has come out of closing
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Fort Ord? The cooperation demonstrated by the 
communities of Monterey during the planning of 
Monterey's local university is not universal. The 
towns of Marina, Seaside, and Sand City want to develop 
the Fort Ord coastline, and they will face a great deal 
of resistance. The key to successful development is 
cooperation, and all parties concerned will have to 
cooperate. A lack of cooperation will lead to no one 
being helped because development will simply freeze 
along the coastline.
The only other problem which the Monterey Peninsula 
faces because of the base closure is the severe 
environmental degradation of certain portions of the 
facility. However, this is a problem which the 
community would have to come to terms with whether the 
base closed or remained open. In addition, the problem 
is not going to deal a serious blow to the area's 
economy because approximately two-thirds of the land is 
not contaminated.
Overall, the Monterey Peninsula will be badly hurt 
by the closure in the beginning, but there is good 
reason to believe that the area will eventually prosper 
from the decision to close Fort Ord.
CHAPTER 4
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY IN HIGH 
STAKES AND HIGH PRESSURE POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
The first naval activity to occur in Long Beach,
California was in 1843. In that year the sloop of war
Gyane decided to drop its anchor in San Pedro Harbor, 
and other ships soon followed. In 1897, San Pedro 
Harbor was visited by a full navy flotilla, and in 
1908, the anchorage was used as a stop for Theodore 
Roosevelt's great white fleet. Inevitably, the navy 
chose to make the harbor a permanent home port for
their operations, and the harbor received that
designation in 1919 when the United States Navy found 
it necessary to divide their fleet into two separate 
fleets (Pacific and Atlantic). The base prospered for 
many years until it was closed in 1950, but the base 
closure was only temporary because the Korean War gave 
a new justification for its existence. The base was 
closed again after the end of the Vietnam War in 1974,
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but again it was opened in 1979. 1
Over the years the base has had to overcome its 
problem of being undervalued and overlooked by the 
United States Navy. The base has been repeatedly 
closed throughout this century only to find its 
facilities reopened by the Navy when the need was 
apparent. Additional evidence of this problem is seen 
in the fact that the Long Beach naval facility was not 
officially established as the headquarters of the 
Pacific Fleet until 1942, but it had served in that 
capacity since 1919.2 ip̂ e navy's first aircraft 
carriers were stationed at this "quasi" headquarters of 
the Pacific Fleet throughout the 1930's, and some of 
the great historical battleships of World War II, like 
the Arizona, were stationed in San Pedro Harbor before 
they moved to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.3
Certainly, the people of the Long Beach area were 
relieved when the facility was re-opened in 1979. They 
were relieved for many reasons, but the most important
l"Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach Press 
Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, pp. INT 35: 
F12-F13).
2"A Final Salute For Naval Station," Los 
Angeles Times, 1 October 1994, p. B3 .
3"'Goodbye to a dear friend,'" Long Beach Press 
Telegram, 1 October 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 69:
C12).
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reason was the fact that the Navy finally appeared to 
appreciate the importance of the facility. The Navy 
spent $130 million on renovations to the base. It 
added a medical & dental clinic, fueling piers, a 
barracks, and off-base housing for naval personnel.
The renovations seemed to signify that the Navy had 
experienced a change of heart in regards to its Long
Beach naval facility.^
However, any assumptions that the Long Beach naval 
facilities would have a long life were brought to an 
abrupt end in the late 1980's. The Long Beach Naval 
Shipyard employs people like Arturo Ramos who was 
president of the Federal Employees Metal Trades Council 
during the late 1980's. His group has had to fight off 
three separate attempts to close the Long Beach Naval 
Shipyards in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The 
workers and local boosters prevented the shipyards from 
being placed on the 1988 base closure list which was a 
list that was later accepted by the United States 
Congress. In 1989, the group was amongst the many 
groups responsible for wrecking a second attempt to 
close the shipyard and 53 other bases. They had hoped 
that these two attempts would be the last attempts at 
closing the shipyards because the 347 acre facility was
4"Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach Press 
Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 35: F13).
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slowly becoming efficient and profitable, but the $10 
million profit margin they had posted was not enough.
The shipyard was again being considered for placement 
on the base closure list in 1991 along with its sister
facilities the Long Beach Naval Station and Hospital.® 
The end result of the 1991 base closure list was 
not encouraging to the Long Beach community. The 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission decided 
to close the Long Beach Naval Station, but it also
decided to keep the Long Beach Naval Shipyards open.
\
However, the Commission gave the Long Beach community 
some additional bad news. They suggested that the 
naval shipyard's status be reevaluated in 1993.®
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURES OF NAVAL FACILITIES IN 
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
Many factors contributed to the Navy's desire to 
close Long Beach's naval facilities, and many of these 
factors became apparent as early as the mid-1980's.
For example, in 1985 the Long Beach Naval Shipyard 
reduced its workforce by 13% or 900 employees. The 
reductions were only the beginning of a downsizing
5"Politics blamed for plan to study closing the 
site," Orange County Register , 1 June 1991, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 97: A6).
®"A Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A3.
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effort that was intended to reduce the facilities 
workforce by 1,500 employees by the end of 1986. The 
layoffs in Long Beach were part of a nationwide 
reduction in employment in the Navy due to a lack of
repair work for the nation's shipyards.7
The reduction in workforce at the shipyard hurt 
the competitiveness of the Long Beach facility because 
many highly skilled workers were removed at a time when 
it needed to show it was an efficient facility. A high 
level of efficiency was needed not simply because of on 
going reductions in the workforce, but also because the 
shipyard had to compete against privately owned 
shipyards for business in 1985. Competition for ship 
repair work is a relatively new procedure for the 
United States Navy.8
However, the end result of the reduction of jobs 
and the increased competition produced a shipyard that 
was given a commendation for being the most efficient 
government operated shipyard in the country in March 
1991.9
However, greater efficiency at the naval shipyard
7"Navy Trimming 900 Jobs at its Long Beach 
Shipyard," Los Angeles Times, 22 November 1985, p. 3.
®Ibid., p. 4.
9"A Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A20.
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did not remove the primary problem facing the Long 
Beach facilities. According to the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission, the main problem 
facing Long Beach was excess pier capacity on the west 
coast. This problem was particularly problematic for 
the Long Beach Naval Station which had deficient 
facilities and an inability to house the entire fleet 
of Southern Californian naval ships. On the other 
hand, San Diego had the capability of housing all of
Southern California's naval vessels.*0 Therefore, San 
Diego received support for keeping its naval station 
open.
The Commission also decided to keep Everett, 
Washington's naval station open because closing the 
station would not remove enough of the excess pier 
capacity in the west coast area. The elimination of 
these two candidates left only Long Beach which the 
Commission believed would produce tremendous savings 
for the government if it was closed. Therefore, they 
advocated closing the facility to reduce pier capacity 
for the Pacific Fleet.H
The politicians of Long Beach have had to fight an
^Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Report to the President 1991 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 49.
13-Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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uphill battle to keep the Long Beach naval facilities 
open. Clearly, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Station, 
and Hospital are run efficiently, but it is undeniable 
that the station and shipyard are too big. Their large 
size and excess capacity invites the elimination of 
jobs and closing of facilities that they have 
experienced over the last ten years.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF NAVAL FACILITIES IN 
LONG BEACH. CALIFORNIA
As previously mentioned, the 1991 base closure 
list contained suggestions for closing all three naval 
facilities in the city of Long Beach. The combined 
economic impact of possibly losing the shipyard, 
station, and hospital was estimated at $3 billion in 
1991. The lose of revenue to the community was 
particularly difficult since the city was currently 
dealing with a local deficit of $26 million.12 Of the 
$3 billion total the Long Beach Naval Station was worth 
$1 billion to the local community in 1994, and the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
guaranteed its closure in the 1991 round of base
12"I11 Wind Blowing in Long Beach," Los Angeles 
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B1.
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closures.13 Also in 1994, it was estimated that the 
possible closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard would 
mean the termination of 3,100 employees, and it is 
estimated that the closure of that property would cost 
the city's economy $750 million.14
The economic impact of the closings would not be 
as severe to the local economy if it was not occurring 
at a time when other industries were having difficulty 
surviving in the area. For example, the area's largest 
local employer is McDonnell Douglas, and in 1991, they 
announced plans to build a major new plant in a 
different state. The plant was going to create the 
company's next generation of commercial jetliners, and 
the decision to place the plant elsewhere may have cost 
the community thousands of jobs. In addition, the 
troubled aircraft company transferred 3,200 jobs from 
the Long Beach area during the same year. Another 
trouble spot for the local economy was the closing of 
Buffums department store in Long Beach. The locally 
founded department store was a major contributor to the 
city's weak retail sales tax base, but it recently went
1 ̂ 1 1 Goodbye to a dear friend,'" Long Beach 
Press Telegram, 1 October 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
69: C12).
1 4 " S h i p y a r d  workers spread the word," Long 
Beach Press Telegram, 23 November 1994, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 84: A14).
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bankrupt. Today, the city receives retail sales tax 
only from two shopping malls in the a r e a . 15
The economic problems of Long Beach present a 
challenge to local and national politicians who are 
tied to the cities electorate. It has often been the 
case in the past that local politicians have used their 
influence in order to maintain a strong economy in the 
area. For example, in 1983 the Long Beach Naval 
Shipyards faced a cut of 800 employees from its 
workforce. All 800 were going to be laid off in the 
following year due to a lack of naval overhaul and 
repair jobs. Many of the workers felt the lay offs 
were being scheduled because the battleship New Jersey 
was currently on duty in Lebanon instead of in port for 
repairs. During the lay off controversy then Secretary 
of the Navy, John Lehman, announced plans to pull the 
battleship Missouri out of moth balls and reactivate it 
at Long Beach. Rep. Daniel E. Lungren (R - Long Beach) 
realized that the reactivation of the battleship could 
prevent the lay offs at the shipyard, and he sent a 
letter to Lehman requesting that he expedite the 
project. Rep. Daniel E. Lungren asked for the matter 
to be expedited because the money earmarked in 1984 for 
the reactivation of the battleship was only enough for
1 5 » m  wind Blowing in Long Beach," Los Angeles 
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B3.
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advanced planning to be done concerning the
reactivation of the Missouri.
There is nothing unusual about what Rep. Lungren 
did for his local constituents. He was simply 
fulfilling his role in the local military iron 
triangle, and his push to prevent the lay offs in his 
district normally would win him the support of voters 
in his district. However, the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission eliminated Congress from the 
process as was noted in Chapter two. Therefore Rep. 
Lungren and his colleagues found it difficult to 
prevent proposals to close various Long Beach 
facilities during the Commission's reign.
When the Commission tried to close the naval 
facilities, they were met by the full political 
opposition of the Long Beach iron triangle, and unlike 
Fort Ord, the people of Long Beach were not willing to 
concede defeat at any point in the battle for their 
facilities.
THE IRON TRIANGLE OF LONG BEACH. FIGHTING TO SAVE A SINKING 
SHIP
As was noted previously, the Long Beach shipyard 
won a commendation for efficiency and innovation in
16»Navy to Lay Off 800 at Long Beach Yard," Los 
Angeles Times, 19 November 1983, sec. 2, p. 7.
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management in March of 1991 because it had saved the 
United States government over $80 million in the 
previous four years. Employees of the shipyard felt 
that its efficient performance had saved the facility 
even though they knew that the base closure commission 
had already threatened to close the naval station and 
hospital. Their assumptions were wrong. The addition 
of the shipyard to the list along with the station and 
hospital came as a shock to local politicians. The 
addition of the shipyard was not just shocking because 
of the facilities recent efficiency rating. It was 
also surprising because local politicians thought they 
had dissuaded Defense Secretary Dick Cheney from 
placing the facility on the list in January through the 
letter writing, lobbying, and picketing activity that 
city officials and workers had engaged in.17
The threatened lose of all three facilities moved 
the entire community into action. Politicians of the 
area started to design their arguments opposing the 
closing of the three facilities. Senator Alan Cranston 
(D - California), Rep. Dana Rohrabacher 
(R - Long Beach), and Rep. Glenn M. Anderson 
(D - Harbor City) all opposed the closing of the Long 
Beach Naval Station. Rohrabacher was particularly
1 7 » m  wind Blowing in Long Beach,1 Los Angeles 
Times, 1 June 1991, p. B1.
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critical of the methods used by the Navy to recommend 
the closure of the station. He pointed out that the 
Navy's selection process had been criticized by the 
General Accounting Office. The selection process had 
rated both the Long Beach station and the Pearl Harbor 
station the same in four separate categories, and yet, 
the Navy never advocated closing the Pearl Harbor 
station. According to Rohrabacher, "'For all the Navy 
can say about it, the yellow [closure] rating for Long 
Beach might as well have been done by a coin flip.1"18
Local officials did not simply blame the Navy's 
faulty analysis for their predicament. Louis 
Rodriguez, the president of Local 174 of the 
Professional and Technical Engineers, felt that it was 
not economics that brought the naval shipyard onto the 
1991 list. He felt that politics had a great deal to 
do with Long Beach's appearance on the list. Rep.
Glenn Anderson agreed with Louis Rodriguez's assesment 
when he pointed out that, "'In recent days, the Long 
Beach Naval Shipyard has come under attack by those 
associated with Philadelphia as they try to replace 
their shipyard with the best of them all.'"18
18"Legislators Seek to Save Ft. Ord, Long Beach 
Base," Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1991, p. A3.
18"Politics blamed for plan to study closing 
the site," Orange County Register, 1 June 1991,
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 97: A6).
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Long Beach assistant city manager John F. Shirley 
also agreed when he said, "'I don't think there is any 
question Philadelphia has been able to assemble a large 
coalition to defend their shipyard."20 Shirley listed 
many prominent politicians whom he believed were a part 
of the Philadelphia iron triangle. He included the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's 
chairman who had represented the state of New Jersey in 
Congress for 12 years. He also included other 
prominent politicians such as, House whip. Rep. William 
Gray (D - Philadelphia); Senator Arlen Specter 
(R - Pennsylvania); and Senator Bill Bradley 
(R - New Jersey). All these politicians were prominent 
national figures and they were all concerned with the 
welfare of Philadelphia and its shipyard. Shirley's 
primary concern was that the Philadelphia iron triangle 
commanded more clout than the Long Beach iron triangle 
which consists of Rep. Rohrabacher (a sophmore 
representative); Rep. Anderson (recently removed from 
his chairmanship of the House Public Works Committee); 
Senator Seymour (a recently appointed Republican of 
California); and Senator Cranston (a lame duck 
Senator). Shirley believed that only a united 
delegation of Southern Californians would be able to
20Ibid.
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defeat Philadelphia, but unfortunately, Southern 
California was divided over the Long Beach shipyard.25- 
In the end. Long Beach officials realized that 
their efforts to keep the Long Beach Naval Station open 
were probably futile, and they placed most of their 
efforts into preserving the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. 
The Commission's elimination of the station meant the 
removal of 29,000 enlisted personnel from the a r e a . 22 
The closure also meant that local officials had to 
shift their efforts to insure that the shipyard was not 
lost in the future.
One of the best ways to prevent a shipyard1s 
closure is to produce enough business for the yard to 
demonstrate that it is necessary to keep it open. In 
1992, California's senators and Los Angeles & Orange 
County's representatives attempted to expand the 
usefulness of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard by giving 
it more business. According to current naval 
procedures, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard is allowed to 
bid on large, long-term repair jobs, but it is not 
allowed to bid on smaller repair jobs which are done 
out of San Diego. The limitation was put in place 
because sailors stationed at San Diego could be forced
25-lbid. , pp. INT 97: A6-A7.
22"a  Bittersweet Reprieve for Naval Workers,"
Los Angeles Times, 1 July 1991, p. A20.
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to make a commute to Long Beach, and the commute could 
place strains on the families of naval personnel. Long 
Beach politicians attempted to reverse this naval 
procedure, and their goal was to allow the Long Beach 
shipyard the ability to bid against San Diego's ship 
repair facilities. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R - Coronado) 
discovered the attempt to "snatch" San Diego jobs, and 
he placed a clause in the Defense Authorization Bill of 
1992 banning Long Beach from taking such an action.
The bill and Hunter's clause passed in the House of 
Representatives, but it was a struggle since two 
separate attempts were made to thwart the progress of 
the clause in c o m m i t t e e . 23
Politicians of Long Beach were unsuccessful in 
their attempt to produce a base that was so 
commercially active that any attempt to close it would 
be deemed foolish. The 1993 round of base closings 
found the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission prepared to add the Long Beach Naval 
Shipyard to its list once again. Long Beach was 
originally not placed on the list of base closures, but 
the Commission placed it there as a possible 
alternative to closing the Mare Island Shipyard of San 
Francisco which was already on the list for
23»Battle Rages Over Ship Repair Maneuver," Los 
Angeles Times, 17 June 1992, p. B2.
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consideration.24
The people of Long Beach began another extensive 
round of lobbying efforts for the shipyard's future, 
but the economic lobbying had little effect on the 
final outcome of the Long Beach shipyard hearings. The 
Long Beach shipyard barely survived the hearing process 
when the Commission voted four to three to keep the 
base open. There was some bad news attached to the 
vote. The bad news was that people expected the 
shipyard facility to be a possible target for the 1995 
round of base c l o s u r e s . 25 one possible reason why the 
base succeeded in staying open was the fact that the 
Navy did not want the base closed originally. The 
United States Navy desired to keep the base open as an 
emergency dry dock for aircraft carriers. Another 
possible reason for the shipyards success in avoiding a 
closure order was the fact that the Commission was 
already closing Mare Island shipyard in California 
during the 1993 round of closures. This position was 
supported by Commissioner Harry C. McPherson Jr. who 
stated, "'Closing two public shipyards [in California]
24"Long Beach Joins Bases Facing Possible 
Closure," Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1993, p. A1 .
25"Long Beach Navy Shipyard Spared," Los 
Angeles Times, 26 June 1993, p. A1.
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is more than this commissioner wants to do in '93.'"26 
However, as the vote points out the rest of the 
Commission did not necessarily agree with McPherson's 
position. Commissioner Robert D. Stuart pointed out 
that the Long Beach Naval Shipyard ought to be closed 
even though it was not included in the base closure 
list submitted to the Commission because the United 
States Navy simply was not going to need Long Beach's 
additional facilities as the Navy's fleet shrunk in
size.27
The sentiments expressed during the 1993 round of 
base closures by Commissioner Stuart were heard by 
local leaders in the Long Beach area, and they began 
preparing for the possibility of their base being 
reconsidered for closure in 1995. People like the 
president of the International Federation of 
Professional and Technical Engineers, Louis Rodriguez, 
began gathering signatures from people in the local 
malls of the Long Beach area. In a two day period 
alone they managed to get 9,000 signatures protesting 
the government's consideration of closing the shipyard. 
The goal of the 1994 effort was to send the letters to 
President Clinton when he received the base closure
26ibid.
27ibid.
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list from the Defense Department for review. It was 
the hope of Rodriguez and other employees that Clinton 
would see these letters and remove the shipyard from 
consideration before the proposal was sent to the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.28 On 
February 28, 1995, their hopes of avoiding the 1995 
round of base closures were ended when the Pentagon 
released its list of recommendations for the 
Commission. Among the few outright base closures on 
the list was the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The list 
advocated more realignments than closures because of 
Clinton's need to generate political support for his 
re-election bid in states like C a l i f o r n i a .29 Another 
reason for the advocacy of fewer closures was the fact 
that the up-front costs of closing bases was beginning 
to become expensive enough to prevent the immediate 
closure of new b a s e s . 20
REDEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG BEACH AREA
Several of the Long Beach area's facilities have
281 Shipyard workers spread the word, " Long 
Beach Press Telegram, 23 November 1994, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 84: A14).
29»Base closure list to be short," Las Vegas 
Review Journal, 26 February 1995, p. 1A.
30ibid., p. 2A.
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been closed by the Commission, and the Long Beach 
community sees a logical need to redevelop the 
properties in order to prevent economic hardship in 
their community. The need to engage in redevelopment 
in the Long Beach area ran into a snag when the United 
States Navy announced its intention to keep the 
property of the Long Beach Naval Station and Hospital 
after the two sites were closed. The 1991 announcement 
by the Navy forced Ernie Kell, the mayor of Long Beach, 
to discuss the possibility of taking the property away 
from the Navy based on legal grounds. According to 
Kell, "We're going to have to take a look at how the 
navy obtained the property (from the c i t y ) . "21 in 
addition to the legal threats issued by the city of 
Long Beach, the city also engaged in land negotiations 
with the Navy in 1991. The Navy, however, intends to 
transfer the bulk of the naval station to the shipyards 
which have not be ordered to close yet. The only 
property which the city may be able to negotiate away 
from the Navy is the hospital, three housing sites, and 
the mole p i e r . 22
Even the Los Alamitos golf courses located on the
21"Navy to hang on to L.B. base property," Long 
Beach Press Telegram, 2 October 1991, (Newsbank Index, 
p. INT 153: Gil).
22ibid., p. INT 153: G12.
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naval station's property is being transferred to the 
shipyard property. The golf courses produce an annual 
profit of $100,000 for the Navy which is used to fund 
other naval recreational facilities in Long Beach like 
the gymnasium and swimming pool. This profit benefits 
naval operations in the area, but the profit level is 
nothing in comparison to the levels of profit the golf 
courses could take in if they were privatized. Joe 
Guerra is the senior vice president of American Golf 
Corporation of Santa Monica and he believes the naval 
golf courses could be worth up to $5 or $10 million if 
they were privatized.23
Over the last several years the United States Navy 
has steadfastly maintained its hold over the majority 
of its Long Beach property, but the city of Long Beach 
has not been content to allow their land negotiations 
to go to waste. On June 28, 1994 the city produced a 
land development proposal for the Long Beach Naval 
Station which was presented to the United States Navy.
The land development proposal was endorsed by the city, 
and the plan included a proposal to bulldoze the base 
and convert 100 acres of the property into a container 
terminal. The Navy decided to consider the proposals,
23»Navy to Keep Beachhead on Golf Links After 
Long Beach Pullout," Los Anqeles Times, 12 September 
1991, p. A3.
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but in exchange, the Navy intends to ask the city of 
Long Beach to fund the renovation of a barracks, 
medical clinic, and exchange & commissary at the
shipyard.24
ANALYSIS OF THE LONG BEACH CASE STUDY
The best way to analyze the Long Beach case study 
is by utilizing the same four questions used in the 
previous Fort Ord case study. The answers to the 
questions will allow both case studies to be more 
readily compared with one another.
The first question which needs to be asked is how 
successful was the process behind the closing of the 
Long Beach Naval shipyard, station, and hospital?
Overall, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission's efforts should be labeled successful, but 
they did have some difficulties. Both the closing of 
the naval station and the hospital were done with 
relatively little difficulty, but the closing of the 
naval shipyard still has not occurred even though the 
Navy will not need the facility as the fleet shrinks in 
size. However, the survival of the shipyard can not 
truly be attributed to anything special done by the
34*Navy brass pulls up anchor," Long Beach 
Press Telegram, 28 June 1994, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
35: F12).
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Long Beach iron triangle, and this was especially true 
during the 1993 round of base closings. It was during 
that round of base closings that the Commission was 
afraid that closing more than one shipyard in 
California would be too much. The lack of resolve 
shown by the Commission in 1993 was a shortcoming of 
the Commission's otherwise fair and effective 
proceedings, but it was a shortcoming which the 
Commission corrected when it placed the shipyard on the 
1995 list of recommendations for base closures.
While the Commission's resolve was occasionally 
tested during the hearings concerning the shipyards it 
was never tested with the station and hospital. In 
both the case of the hospital and the station the 
Commission weighed the evidence for and against closing 
each and decided to close each because they were 
unnecessary facilities that were costing the government 
too much to keep open.
The second question of this analysis concerns 
whether or not there were any unusual or unique 
patterns of political behavior displayed in the Long 
Beach case study? Three aspects of the case study 
stand out. The first unique aspect of this case study 
is that, like the Fort Ord case, the local military 
iron triangle was broken by the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission. However, unlike the
previous case study the Long Beach iron triangle 
initially did make some progress in opposition to the 
Commission. A second interesting aspect of this case 
study was the angry tone of the political discussion 
set by the Long Beach iron triangle during the 
hearings. The angry and highly political tone is not 
necessarily unique to other battles waged by local 
military iron triangles, but it serves as an 
interesting contrast to the more subdued approach taken 
by the Fort Ord iron triangle. The contrasting tactics 
are particularly interesting because they demonstrate 
that neither tactic guarantees success against the 
Commission. The third interesting aspect of the case 
study was that the iron triangle of Long Beach did 
display a genuine concern about redevelopment of the 
closed bases. The concern was less well pronounced 
than in the Fort Ord case, but nevertheless, the iron 
triangle did alter its mission (keeping bases open) 
somewhat when it became involved in the redevelopment 
of the naval station.
The third question of this analysis is whether or 
not any good has come out of closing the Long Beach 
naval complex? Unfortunately, the only one who seem to 
be benefitting from the various facility closures in 
Long Beach is the United States government. The 
closure of the Long Beach naval facilities will allow
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the United States government to save a considerable 
amount of money as time goes on, but the base closure 
will hurt the local governments of the Long Beach area. 
They will be hurt initially by the closing of the 
bases, but their biggest problem in the long term may 
be getting the United States Navy to release the 
property for redevelopment.
Finally, the fourth question is whether or not 
anything bad has come because of the closing of the 
Long Beach naval facilities? Long Beach may have made 
a bad situation worse by opposing the Commission's 
wishes for so long, and the Commission may not have 
been doing the people of Long Beach any favors by 
allowing the naval shipyards to stay open beyond the 
1993 round of base closures. The community fight with 
the Commission has continued on with only a little 
attention being given to the redevelopment of the 
facilities. The length of the battle with the 
Commission has also put them in a position in which 
they will be one of the last communities to ask the 
government for assistance in their redevelopment 
proposals. It is conceivable that they will be given 
very little aid because other communities came before 
them.
Overall, the chances for productive redevelopment 
of the Long Beach facility look fairly unfavorable in
the near future, and the primary culprits are the 
volatile Long Beach iron triangle and the overly 
compassionate Commission. The combination of hostility 
and compassion has only postponed the inevitable 
closure of the Long Beach facilities, and if the Long 
Beach community finds that they have lost the shipyard 
after the 1995 round of base closures they will have 
done little to prepare for a future without the bases.
CHAPTER 5
NORTON AIR FORCE BASE: A CASE STUDY IN LOCAL
GREED, JEALOUSY, AND UNCOOPERATIVENESS
INTRODUCTION
Norton Air Force Base is located in San Bernadino, 
California, and in 1988, the base employed a total of 
4,500 military and 2,133 civilian employees. The Air 
Force base was the home of the 63rd Military Airlift 
Wing, and it also was where other air wings like the 
445th military airlift wing were stationed. The 
airlift wings allow the base to maintain airlift 
capability for air and ground forces, and the base can 
deliver these forces expeditiously to anywhere in the 
world. In addition to the bases' airlift capabilities, 
it also served as a headquarters for the Air Force 
Inspection and Safety Center, the Ballistic Missile 
Office, and the United States Air Force Audit Agency.1
The 53rd Airlift Squadron was amongst the 
different air wings which served at Norton Air Force
1"Presidio Among 6 in California on Target 
List," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1988, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 165: D9).
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Base, and like many other airwings at the base they 
have been in every conceivable type of military mission 
requiring airlift capabilities. In 1942, the 53rd 
Airlift Squadron dropped paratroopers over Sicily from 
C-47's, and they delivered 8,500 gallons of gasoline to 
General George Patton's troops in Frankfurt, Germany. 
They have also seen military action in places like 
Korea and Da Nang, but the airlift squadron was not 
limited just to flights over combat zones. The 
squadron also served in humanitarian efforts like the 
Berlin airlift, and they have served in relief efforts 
during domestic disasters like hurricanes in Florida 
and the emergency cleanup of Three Mile Island. The 
various airlift wings of Norton Air Force Base are 
vital to the proper functioning of military plans, but 
they are not the first image that pops into mind when 
one thinks about the Air Force. Colonel John D. Hopper 
Jr. admitted as much when he said, "'The more glamorous 
missions belong to the shooters who drop the bombs and 
shoot the guns.'"2
Norton Air Force Base has seen a great deal of 
activity over the years, but nothing in its history 
compares to the amount of activity during the Vietnam 
War. Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Nelson described Norton
^"Final Fliqht," Los Anqeles Times, 30 April 
1993, p. A3.
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Air Force Base during the Vietnam War as a "virtual sky 
highway" connecting the United States to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam. However, the high level of activity 
during the Vietnam War subsided quickly with the ending 
of hostilities, and the base was scheduled for closure 
in the 1970's. The base was not closed then because 
the entire list of proposed base closures was 
terminated, and it was not until late 1988 that 
Norton's personnel started to hear rumors of a new
effort to close the facility.^
Initially, the communities surrounding Norton 
prepared to battle the United States government to 
preserve the existence of their base, but unlike the 
other previously mentioned base closure case studies, 
the San Bernadino community offered very little actual 
resistance to the government's plans to close the base. 
The Presidential Commission recommended closing Norton 
Air Force Base in December of 1988, and by January of 
1989 the county, cities, and community leaders of the 
area had formed the Norton Economic Expansion 
Committee. The mission of the committee was to oppose 
any attempt to close Norton and to prepare the 
community for redevelopment of the area if the
^"The Last Waltz at 86 Military Bases,"
Insight/Washington Times, 9 October 1989, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 113: Cll).
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committee failed in its efforts. After only four 
months of struggling against the federal government the 
communities surrounding Norton Air Force Base realized 
that the closure of their base was inevitable. Between 
April and June of 1989 the committee began to address
various ideas on how the property could be r e u s e d . ^
The plan to close Norton was approved, but the 
plan did not require the entire base to close. The 
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure gave the Air 
Force the option of keeping the Aerospace Audiovisual 
Service at Norton Air Force Base or moving it to March 
Air Force Base in Riverside, California. The Air Force 
chose to move the facility to Riverside. The 
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure also told 
the Air Force that the Ballistic Missile Office in 
Norton would be maintained at Norton, and 300 homes at 
the Norton facility would be kept open for the missile
office workers and personnel of March Air Force B a s e . 5
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CLOSURE OF NORTON AIR FORCE BASE
The Defense Secretary's Commission On Base
^"Battle for land sparks base fears, emotions," 
San Bernadino Sun, 3 June 1990, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 
63: Bl).
5"EPA ties toxics cleanup to development at 
Norton," San Bernadino Sun, 9 March 1989, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 27: A9).
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Realignment and Closure had four justifications for 
their desire to close Norton Air Force base. One of 
the reasons was the fact that flight operations at 
Norton were constrained by an increase in air traffic 
in the Los Angeles area. Another reason for closing 
the base was the fact that the warehouses were 
deteriorating and most other facilities on the base 
needed to be upgraded to meet current standards of 
technology. A third reason was the fact that the 
quality of life at the base was inferior. The base has 
a shortage of family housing units and inadequate 
medical, dental, and recreational facilities. Finally, 
the base was closed because the United States 
government had a surplus of capacity in the category of 
strategic-airlift installation.6
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF NORTON AIR FORCE 
BASE ON THE SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES AND THE INLAND EMPIRE
The actual degree of economic damage that the 
closing of Norton Air Force Base will have on the local 
community is difficult to ascertain. According to 
Mayor Evelyn Wilcox of San Bernadino the base closure 
would have a profound effect on San Bernadino, and the
^The Defense Secretary's Commission On Base 
Realignment and Closure. Report of the Defense 
Secretary's Commission (Washington D.C.: 1988), p. 77.
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closure would remove $248 million from the community 
when it withdrew its annual payroll. It is certainly 
true that the closing of the base would mean the ending 
of 6,600 jobs in the area, but an additional 1,300 jobs 
at the base would be kept because the nearby Air Force 
Ballistic Missile base was not affected by the military 
cutbacks. In fact, the lose of jobs in the area may be 
more of an illusion than anyone realizes. Colonel 
Brooke P. Bailey pointed out at a press conference 
that, "'the vast majority1 of those losing their jobs 
would get new ones at other bases, in many cases at 
nearby March Air Force Base in R i v e r s i d e .
Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Nelson tended to agree 
with Bailey's assessment of the economic impact of the 
base closure. He pointed out the fact that the total 
number of jobs scheduled to move ten miles south to 
March Air Force Base was 2,800. He also pointed out 
that the short term impact of the base closure would be 
minimal with an overall positive effect for the 
community in the long term. Nelson said the reason for 
the minimal short term impact on the region was 
because, "We have 3,500 civilians here, but it's going 
to be two or three years down the road before anyone
^"Presidio Among 6 in California on Target 
List," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1988, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 165: D6).
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starts losing jobs."®
Another factor which may reduce the overall impact 
of the facilities closure on the economy of the area is 
that the base will become one of the biggest chunks of 
real estate open to development in the Southern 
California area. In addition, the property is located 
in a part of town where the cost of real estate is much 
less expensive. The end result of inexpensive and 
available land has sparked a tremendous amount of 
interest in purchasing the land, and it is likely to be 
developed by local authorities and private companies 
because the Pentagon is discouraging federal 
development.9
The land value of Norton Air Force Base alone was 
estimated at $200 million in 1990. Additional assets 
of the property include 200 buildings, and 1,500 acres 
of hangars and runways. The Air Force facilities are
large enough to handle 747 jets.10
®"The Last Waltz at 86 Military Bases,"
Insight/Washington Times, 9 October 1989, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 113: Cll).
9Ibid.
10"San Bernadino learns there's life after a 
base closes," Austin American-Statesman, 4 February 
1990, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 14: D5).
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THE IRON TRIANGLE OF NORTON AIR FORCE BASE: FIGHTING OVER A 
FEW SCRAPS OF MEAT
As previously mentioned, the people affected by 
the closing of Norton Air Force Base did relatively 
little to prevent their base from being closed, and in 
fact,the majority of the local iron triangle's 
political activity was used to keep other facilities, 
that were not a part of the closure, from being added 
to the list. For example, in November of 1989 the 
United States Air Force considered the idea of finding 
a legal loop hole to close the Ballistic Systems 
Division in San Bernadino. The loophole that the Air 
Force wanted to create was necessary because the United 
States Congress had recently passed a law specifically 
stating that the Ballistics Systems Division was to 
remain in San Bernadino. Therefore, they decided to 
reorganize the division under a different Air Force 
unit, and move it to an Air Force unit at Vandenberg 
Air Force Base near Lompoc. The move would have been 
perfectly legal even though it defied the spirit of the 
law passed by Congress which stated that moving the 
division would cost too much.11
Upon hearing about the political maneuvers of the
11"AF Trying to Move Unit in Defiance of Law," 
Los Angeles Times, 17 November 1989, (Newsbank Index, 
p. INT 139: F7).
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Air Force the local iron triangle moved into full 
action. Rep. George E. Brown Jr. (D - Colton) moved 
his congressional aides into a full scale effort to 
prevent the move. Rep. Brown was especially opposed to 
the closing of the Ballistic Systems Division because 
it was set to occur at a time when the local economy 
would be vulnerable to the problems caused by the 
closing of Norton Air Force Base. The Air Force has 
begun to back away from its original position of moving 
the division because of the protests of the 
congressmen. Rep. Brown has assured his constituents 
that he would not back down from the fight, and in a 
statement to the press he said, "'I didn't like having 
Norton closed to begin with, and I lost on that,... But 
in losing that, we got a clear statement that BSD 
remains. Now it is the Air Force's turn to try to 
change the law, not mine.'"12
Another incident which required the attention of 
the local iron triangle was the problem of 
environmental cleanups at the base. According to Rep. 
Jerry Lewis (R - Redlands) the Air Force told the 
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure that some 
waste sites at Norton would not be completely clean 
until 1998. The report to the Commission disturbed
12Ibid.
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Rep. Lewis who feared that the Pentagon would place 
more importance in purchasing new weapons than in 
cleaning old bases. He urged the Commission to keep 
the focus of the Pentagon on cleaning the old bases.
Rep. Lewis was supported by Rep. Brown who requested an 
increase in Defense Department funding for the cleanup 
at Norton and other polluted bases around the
country.12
Rep. Brown also lobbied members of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee concerning the future 
land-use of Norton Air Force Base. The economic 
development assistant to congressman Brown pointed out 
that some aspects of the cleanup at Norton could take 
ten or twenty years. Therefore, Rep. Brown asked the 
congressional committee to look into ways to allow 
Norton's land to be redeveloped without preventing 
efforts to protect the environment.^
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE NORTON AIR FORCE BASE 
CLOSURE
The environmental cleanup of Norton Air Force Base
13"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press 
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52: 
El).
^"Toxics cloud Norton AFB redevelopment," Los 
Angeles Business Journal, 19 August 1991, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 139: F2).
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is a particularly important issue for the people living 
near the base because Norton Air Force Base is amongst 
the 1,000 sites across the country listed as part of 
the Superfund list. Julie Andrews was the chief of the 
Environmental Protection Agency's Federal Enforcement 
Section in March of 1989 when the people of Norton Air 
Force Base were having difficulties with the cleanup of 
the base. Andrews complained that the officials at 
Norton Air Force Base where moving too slowly towards 
drafting cleanup plans for the base. The people at the 
Environmental Protection Agency felt the process was 
going so slow that at one point in early 1989 they 
considered getting the Department of Justice to sue the 
Department of Defense in order to speed up cleanup 
efforts.*5 Fortunately for all parties concerned, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
Defense came to an agreement in May of 1989 without 
legal action. The goal of the agreement between the 
two agencies was to speed up the cleanup process, and 
the agreement obligated the Air Force to search a wider 
and deeper area for environmental contamination. The 
agreement also obligated the Air Force to check and 
remove ruptured underground tanks and commit to
15«epa ties toxics cleanup to development at
Norton," San Bernadino Sun, 9 March 1989, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 27: A9).
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specified deadlines for completing the cleanup. Alexis 
Strauss, the chief of the Superfund enforcement branch 
for the Environmental Protection Agency, pointed out 
that, "'The biggest change is that what they have been 
doing in the past has been at their own direction.
What will happen at the base from now on will be driven
by EPA and the state.'"10
The estimated cost of cleanup at Norton Air Force 
Base was $44.8 million, and an additional $4 million is 
expected to be used to monitor the area for twenty 
years to insure that no environmental pollutants 
remain. More than half of the money will be spent to 
cleanup a single dump located in the northeastern corner 
of the facility. The dump operated for 22 years from 
1958 to 1980, and it received large quantities of 
general refuse and smaller quantities of industrial 
waste like: trichloroethylene, carbon tetrachloride,
refrigerant, acids, paint strippers, paint thinners, 
and waste oils. All these chemicals were placed in 
large trenches which were twenty to fourty feet deep.17
The dump in the northeastern portion of the bases'
i6"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
D14).
17"Cost of Norton toxic cleanup pegged at $44.8 
million, documents show," San Bernadino Sun, 8 May 
1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52: E2).
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property is a major concern for the redevelopment plans 
of Norton, but it is not the only concern. For 
example, the Air Force is going to dig up property near 
the 11th tee of their golf course because it was once 
used as a radioactive waste burial site. Materials 
placed underground were used for painting radioactive 
radium on dials used by the Air Force. Another problem 
is a waste drum storage site which has been used since 
1961 to store hazardous waste temporarily until it 
could be shipped to a permanent facility. The storage 
drums may have leaked over the last two decades.
Finally, the base has a problem with twelve old 
industrial wastewater treatment plants. The beds have 
high concentrations of lead which in some cases are 
within 500 feet of municipal wells outside the bases' 
property.10
The Air Force has a great deal of cleanup work to 
do, but they are not concerned about the local 
communities' inability to redevelop the facility and 
integrate it into the local economy. According to Gary 
Vest, the Air Force deputy assistant secretary for 
environment, safety, and occupational health, the 
majority of the base can be transferred to the 
community even if the cleanup is not completed before
18Ibid.
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the base closes. The reason is because most of the 
toxic waste contamination is located in the 
northwestern section of the base. In this section of 
the base the ground water contains dangerous levels of 
petroleum wastes and solvents.19
A more difficult problem concerning the local 
communities surrounding Norton Air Force Base is the 
effect of military pollutants on municipal water 
reserves. The municipal wells that provide the city of 
Riverside with its water supply are currently being 
threatened by an underground plume of pollutants from 
the base. The plume is moving through the water table 
at a rate of six inches a day below the base property, 
and some people feel it may be moving even more quickly 
in areas outside the base property. Almost 75% of 
Riverside's water is provided by twenty wells which are 
located within a mile of the property, and at least two 
of them currently demonstrate levels of contamination.
The Air Force has agreed to reimburse the city for 
contaminated water supplies, and they have started the 
process of digging wells near toxic hot spots. The 
goal of these newly constructed wells is to extract 
polluted water, cleanse it, and replace it in the water
19"Norton cleanup accord," Riverside Press 
Enterprise, 18 May 1989, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 52:
D14).
124
table.20
MURPHY'S L A W  AND THE REDEVELOPMENT OF NORTON AIR FORCE 
BASE
The Norton base closure started off better than 
any of the other base closures previously examined.
The community realized the lack of control they had 
over the future fate of their base, and they opted to 
put all of their efforts into redevelopment of the 
property. Therefore, the communities did not have to 
go through the wasted money, time, and effort that 
Monterey and Long Beach endured when they vainly 
attempted to preserve the existence of their bases. 
Therefore, it would be safe to assume that the 
community had a smooth transition from military 
facility to private real estate, but Norton's 
transition was plagued by more problems than any of the 
other case studies experienced. The primary reason for 
these problems sprouted from a lack of unity in the 
community concerning the redevelopment of Norton.
Initially, the communities did not suffer from a 
lack of unity when they came together to form a 
redevelopment committee for Norton Air Force Base. The
20"wells drilled in pollution probe," Riverside 
Press Enterprise, 1 July 1992, (Newsbank Index p. INT 
83: Cl).
end result of their labors was the Inland Valley 
Development Agency which was comprised of city, county, 
state, and federal authorities.21 The Inland Valley 
Development Agency also had a great deal of good luck 
in their first attempts to lure clients to the base 
property. In January of 1990 the Lockheed corporation 
requested permission to utilize some of the old 
facilities at Norton for a commercial aircraft 
maintenance center. The maintenance facility was 
expected to employ as many as 970 workers by the year 
1994, and the Lockheed corporation's marketing study 
projected highly positive business opportunities for 
the center into the year 2000. According to the study, 
Lockheed projected that commercial airlines would 
contract out $900 million dollars worth of repair and 
maintenace work for its fleets of Boeing 747 passenger 
jets. H.T. Bowling, the president of Lockheed Aircraft 
Service Company in Ontario, pointed out that the four 
old hangar bays at Norton were well suited to 747's and 
would save the company $20 million in new 
construction.22
21"San Bernadino learns there's life after a 
base closes," Austin American Enterprise, 4 February 
1990, (Newsbank Index p. INT 14: D5).
22"Lockheed Proposes to Convert Norton Base to
Civilian Use," Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1990, p.
Dl.
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Overall, the project appeared to be perfectly 
suited to the base, and it would seem difficult to 
imagine any opposition to the plan. However, mayor Bob 
Holcomb of San Bernadino delayed the development of the 
proposal because he felt he had not been adequately 
familiarized with the plan. His delay did not kill the 
project, but the delay of future negotiations cost 
Lockheed $50 million in lost contracts and it cost the 
San Bernadino economy $1.8 million per month in local 
payroll.23
Mayor Holcomb's actions complicated the Lockheed 
project and cost the company a considerable amount of 
money, but it was not the end of the problems that 
Lockheed would have while doing business in the San 
Bernadino area. By September of 1991 the company 
received approval to use the hangars, but they needed 
to replace the floors in the hangars before they could 
begin operations at the facilities. Lockheed removed 
the floors and discovered the soil underneath the 
hangars was contaminated with various toxic chemicals.
The discovery of the pollutants brought a series of 
state and federal orders to stop progress on the 
project until the contaminates were removed. The
23"Battle for land sparks base fears,
emotions," San Bernadino Sun, 3 June 1990, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 63: All).
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discovery of contaminants at the hangars added nine 
months and $1 million to the cost of opening the 
facility to commercial u s e . 24
The opposition of Mayor Holcomb and unknown 
environmental pollutants at the base could have meant 
the end to Lockheed's bid to redevelop a portion of 
Norton Air Force Base. Fortunately, one community 
leader's opposition to a project was not enough to 
scare investors away, but it was not the only example 
of disunity in the community. In fact, the struggle to 
control the redevelopment of Norton Air Force Base has 
sparked five separate law suits, and it has helped San 
Bernadino County earn the reputation of being home to 
the most vicious base-reuse battle in the nation. 
Apparently, the lack of local unity demonstrated in the 
Lockheed project is a chronic problem of the San 
Bernadino area. William Leonard Sr., a state 
Republican Party chief, pointed out the problem when he 
lamented that, "'It's unfortunate, but our political 
leaders have a tendency to be very parochial... I think 
the biggest problem is the mistrust between individuals
24"ciosing up bases a messy business,"
Sacramento Bee, 1 September 1991, (Newsbank Index, p.
INT 139: Ell).
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at the local level.1"25
The law suits were started by the communities of 
San Bernadino, Redlands, and Highland. All three 
communities have an interest in how Norton Air Force 
Base is developed because Norton Air Force Base is 
located in San Bernadino and is surrounded by the 
communities of Highland and Redlands. These three 
communities filed their law suits over disputes 
concerning how much land and money each community would 
have to contribute to the development of Norton Air 
Force Base and how much profit each community would 
receive from the redevelopment project. For example, 
the city of Highland complained that it would have to 
give away half of its extra property tax on 
approximately 88% of its land in order to join the 
Inland Valley Development Agency. The city of Redlands 
also complained that being a part of the bases' 
redevelopment process would be too costly. Swen 
Larson, a Redlands City Councilman, complained about 
proposals to turn over real estate located near 
Interstate 10 in Redlands. Larson pointed out that, 
"'That's some of the prime real estate in the Inland 
Empire,... I am very reluctant to see it diluted into a
25"Battle for land sparks base fears,
emotions," San Bernadino Sun, 3 June 1990, (Newsbank
Index, p. INT 63: All).
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tax-sharing arrangement with that agency.'"26
However, Highland and Redlands are not the only 
cities complaining about the greedy demands of other 
cities in the area. The city of San Bernadino is 
expected to collect millions of dollars from sales and 
utility taxes when the base moves out of federal hands. 
The city of San Bernadino has never been allowed to 
collect taxes on Norton Air Force Base in the past, and 
both Highland and Redlands feel that the city 
government of San Bernadino should share the Norton tax 
base with other communities in the surrounding area.
Mayor Holcomb feels that the city of San Bernadino is 
entitled to all of the taxes generated within their 
city's borders since they will have to pay for all the 
city services provided to the Norton Air Force Base 
area like police and fire services.27
Another redevelopment fiasco occurred in December 
of 1990 although local community tensions were not 
responsible for its occurrence. A Los Angeles 
developer by the name of Iddo Benzeevi proposed a 
master plan for the development of Norton Air Force 
Base. The master plan included the building of a high
26ifc>id., (Newsbank Index, p. INT 63: A13).
27"Agencies reach stalemate in reuse 
negotiations," San Bernadino Sun, 4 June 1990,
(Newsbank Index, p. INT 63: Bll).
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technology research facility and a sports center. It 
also included an amusement park which was to be 
designed by the movie mogul George L u c a s . 28 The 
project was ambitious and required a great deal of 
financial backing which became its downfall. The 
project was troubled by developers who backed away from 
financing the project, and by June of 1991 Benzeevi 
lost his exclusive right to develop the a r e a . 29
By 1992 the local communities had succeeded in 
developing the bases' hangars, but their attempt at a 
master plan for the base had failed. However, the 
local communities were still willing to develop a 
second master plan for the area which was started in
1993. By September 9, 1993 the San Bernadino area had 
succeeded in convincing the Air Force Base Disposal 
Agency to lease the base to local authorities so that 
it could be developed into a commercial mixed use 
airport. Finally, the communities of the Inland Empire 
had come to an agreement as to how the base should be 
developed, but the communities neglected to take into 
consideration the desires of certain community
28"Diverse Uses for Norton Air Base Planned 
When It Closes," Los Angeles Times, 13 December 1990, 
p. A3.
29"Toxics cloud Norton AFB redevelopment," Los 
Angeles Business Journal, 19 August 1991, (Newsbank 
Index, p. INT 139: FI).
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organizations. One such organization was the Western 
Eagle Foundation which provides food for approximately 
100,000 homeless people in the San Bernadino and 
Riverside areas. Western Eagle requested that the 
entire base and its 10,000 foot runway be given to the 
organization so that it could develop a job training 
center and a base of operations for conducting 
worldwide humanitarian flights. Normally, the 
community organization would have been overlooked 
because it had not petitioned the Air Force first. 
However, federal laws gave priority to local homeless 
charities which petitioned the government for ownership 
of base facilities. Therefore, the San Bernadino 
International Airport Authority was denied a long term 
lease on the land until Western Eagle's request could 
be considered.30
The local communities failed to consider the needs 
of Western Eagle, and they would have had great 
difficulty protecting their dreams of developing a 
commercial airport if Western Eagle's fiscal integrity 
had not been questioned. According to the Riverside 
Press Enterprise the base could cost up to $300 million 
to renovate over the next twenty years. The cost was 
high, but Western Eagle claimed that it had enough
30"Rival Request Clouds Conversion of Air 
Base," Los Angeles Times, 9 September 1993, p. A3.
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backers to make a serious bid for the base. Western 
Eagle's backers included a Russian development group 
and a lawyer from Utah who promoted food supplements 
that allegedly cured cancer. The Department of Health 
and Human Services was understandably curious about the 
backgrounds of Western Eagle's financial backers and 
requested more information. Along with the mysterious 
background of the financial backers of Western Eagle 
there were other questions surrounding the charity 
organization. For example, why did none of the other 
well established local charities in the area have any 
knowledge of Western Eagle's operations in the Inland 
Empire? Why was Western Eagle reluctant to release a 
list of the organization's directors when it applied to 
join Survive Food Bank? Finally, when Western Eagle 
applied for usage of Norton Air Force Base, why were 
three homeless people listed as three of the directors
in charge of Western Eagle's operations?^1
In the end, the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services determined that Western Eagle had not 
demonstrated the financial ability and experience to 
accomplish its goals. Therefore, the Department of 
Health and Human Services only awarded the organization
31"Mystery jolts Norton AFB," Riverside Press 
Enterprise, 3 October 1993, (Newsbank Index, p. INT 70: 
Cl).
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five warehouses on the base for food banks. The rest 
of the base property in dispute was given to the local 
community for development into a commercial a i r p o r t . 32
ANALYSIS OF THE NORTON AIR FORCE CASE STUDY
In reviewing this case study it is necessary to 
discuss how successful the process was behind the 
closing of Norton Air Force Base? The Norton Air Force 
Base closure was done quite successfully by comparison 
to both of the previous case studies reviewed in 
chapters three and four. One reason why this 
particular base closure was so much more successful 
than the others was because the local iron triangle of 
San Bernadino had a stronger respect for the base 
closure commission's power than the iron triangles of 
Monterey and Long Beach. The people of San Bernadino 
understood that they had little chance to save their 
base, and they did not choose to challenge the 
Commission. Ironically, the Commission was arguably 
less powerful in 1988 than in the future rounds because 
its legitimacy was not originally based upon 
legislation in the 1988 round of base closures.
The base closure was also successful because
32"pians for Civilian Airport at Norton AFB 
Kept Alive," Los Angeles Times, 23 November 1993, p.
A3.
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politics played virtually no role in the decision 
making process of closing Norton Air Force Base. The 
decision to close Norton was based upon the fact that 
Norton was an outdated facility in a category of Air 
Force bases that had a surplus. Norton's closure was a 
natural choice.
The review of the Norton Air Force Base case study 
also needs to consider whether or not there were any 
unusual or unique patterns of political behavior 
displayed in their case. In this case, there is very 
little evidence that can be compared with that of the 
Fort Ord and the Long Beach case studies. The local 
iron triangle of San Bernadino never truly attempted to 
engage in a political fight against the Commission. 
Instead it opted to invest all its efforts into 
redevelopment of the property. The economic 
redevelopment of Norton Air Force Base is probably the 
single most unique aspect of this case study because it 
illustrated what many people feared would happen in the 
economic redevelopment of Fort Ord. Fortunately, the 
Monterey Peninsula did not suffer from such a high level 
of disunity, but the potential for disagreement still 
exists. They would be wise to observe the political 
and economic problems of the Inland Empire.
Certainly, the news from San Bernadino is not all 
bad, and in fact, many good things have come from the
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closure of Norton. For example, the redevelopment of 
the base was successful. Redevelopment still has many 
obstacles to overcome like environmental pollution and 
the lose of military jobs, but the community has gained 
a modern airport facility which will produce more jobs 
and benefits than the former base ever could have 
produced. In addition to the community receiving 
benefits, the United States government saved money by 
closing the facility.
Overall, the closure will be viewed as a success 
in the future, but in the short term it has caused a 
considerable amount of damage to the political 
relationships of the area's local city governments.
It has also hurt relations between city governments and 
corporations like Lockheed who were subjected to petty 
political squabbles that cost them a considerable 
amount of money. In some cases, the base closure may 
have even hurt relationships between city government 
and community charity organizations who felt they may 
have been overlooked in the redevelopment of Norton Air 
Force Base.
CONCLUSION
ARE THE ELITES. INTEREST GROUPS. OR A COMBINATION OF THE T W O  
RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT BASE CLOSURES IN THE UNITED STATES?
Chapters one and two pointed out that the 
responsibilities for base closures were shared between 
the Department of Defense and the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission. However, the case studies 
of Fort Ord, Long Beach, and Norton point out the fact 
that the local iron triangles also played a valuable 
role in the process of base closures. In each case 
study it can not be debated that the unelected 
bureaucrats of the Defense Department and the base 
closure Commission had the final word concerning which 
bases were to remain open and which bases were to 
close, but once their judgements were made they no 
longer participated in any valuable way concerning the 
fate of the bases. The future redevelopment plans for 
the bases were determined by local iron triangles 
because they had to live with the decisions made by the 
Commission.
The decisions made by the local iron triangles 
differed from the decisions made by the bureaucrats of 
the Defense Department in the fact that local iron
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triangles considered the needs of local interest 
groups. The Commission and Defense Department based 
their decisions primarily upon the needs of policy 
makers in the United States government. Therefore, 
military base closure decisions in the 1980's & 1990's 
were determined by the political elites, but the end 
results of those decisions were influenced by local 
interest groups.
Of course these were not the only groups 
responsible for the base closures. Both the President 
and the Congress played roles in approving the base 
closures, but their roles were only minor by comparison 
to the other political elites and interest groups.
Their roles were minor because of the actions taken by 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and 
the Department of Defense. These two institutions 
produced small lists of base closures which allowed a 
majority of congressmen and the President to avoid 
angry reactions from their constituents. The lack of a 
voter backlash to their actions allowed both the 
President and the Congress to close the bases according 
to the wishes of the Commission.
Certainly, the United States government can 
consider the actions taken by the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission a great success, but can the 
United States government look back upon its decision to
close bases and claim that it was a wise decision? It 
has been pointed out before that closures are fiscally 
wise because of the federal budget deficit of the 
1980's and 1990's, but it is arguable that the greatest 
damage of these decisions will be felt in the local 
communities. The wisdom of the federal government's 
decisions may be debatable in the localities, but 
historically, communities have become economically 
stronger because of base closures. In fact, this has 
been demonstrated in the case studies of Fort Ord and 
Norton Air Force Base. In these cases the building of 
a University and an international airport will bring a 
better economy to the area. The Long Beach Naval 
Complex's redevelopment may not be as successful as the 
Fort Ord or Norton Air Force Base redevelopment, but 
its success is difficult to ascertain since the future 
of the complex has not yet been fully determined.
FUTURE RESEARCH CONCERNING THE POLITICS BEHIND BASE 
CLOSURES: W H A T  CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND UPON 
W H A T  IS ALREADY KNOWN?
At least four tasks face future researchers of 
this topic. First of all, future researchers need to 
analyze the roles of civilian and military personnel in 
base closures. It is possible that the reason why the 
people of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard were so hostile 
towards their base being closed is because of the fact
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that they were not military personnel. Civilian 
employees are more strongly tied to their municipality 
than are military employees. Future analysis of 
hostile base closures during the 1980's and 1990's may 
reveal that the majority of the opposition to the base 
closures came from civilian employees.
A second task facing researchers of this topic is 
the need to create more case studies of actual base 
closures. No scholarly work currently exists 
concerning the base closures of Fort Ord, Norton Air 
Force Base, and the Long Beach Naval Complex. The only 
material currently available concerning these bases can 
be found in newspapers and magazines. More case work 
needs to be done before anyone can truly be able to 
claim they have found patterns of political behavior in 
the recent bout of base closures.
The third task facing researchers of this topic is 
comparing the base closures of the 1980's and 1990's 
with previous base closures. The contrasts and 
comparisons between various periods of successful and 
unsuccessful base closures may reveal new information 
concerning how public policy works in the United 
States. However, this task will probably have to be 
done after more case studies have been accumulated.
The final task facing researchers is a problem 
facing not just people who are researching base
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closures but anyone who is doing public policy research 
about the military. The current information available 
today concerning the military iron triangle rarely 
discusses the influence of the iron triangle upon 
military bases. The main focus of books about the iron 
triangle usually is the military industrial firm or the 
political action committee of the military industrial 
firm. Authors are much less likely to discuss how the 
iron triangle prevents a base from closing, and this 
problem in the literature needs to change before the 
iron triangle's role in base closures can be more fully 
understood. Therefore, researchers in the field of 
military public policy ought to begin putting more 
emphasis on how the iron triangle affects bureaucratic 
decisions behind base closures.
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